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ABSTRACT 
 
            The first essay investigates the relatively higher energy efficiency (EE) 
investment rates in housing units of homeowners versus those of renters. In the empirical 
analysis, discrete choice models are employed to explore households’ EE investment 
behavior. After testing three groups of implications derived from the initial analysis, the 
paper suggests that due to the existence of contracting costs, landlords/renters make 
efficient decisions to invest less in EE than homeowners due to renters’ increased 
mobility and the characteristics of typical EE investments.  
            The second essay analyzes households’ choices of energy efficient dishwashers 
and the potential influence from those choices on dish washing behavior.  An ordered 
Probit model is developed to investigate households’ demand for dish washing services. 
Two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) is used to deal with the endogeneity problem, caused 
by households choosing energy efficient dishwashers because of higher expected usage 
frequency. Households using energy efficient dish washers compared with households 
using standing dishwashers display approximately 7.7% more frequent usage behavior. 
            The final essay examines U.S. residential consumption of four main fuels. 
Double-log demand models are applied and two-stage residual inclusion is used to 
address price endogeneity. Besides various elasticity estimates, the paper further explores 
causes of the rising per capital electricity consumption over time despite the efficiency 
progress. Historical survey data reveal that households increase electricity consumption 
by increasing the quantity of electronics and/or purchasing electronics with extra energy-
consuming attributes. 
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 1 Introduction 
In the United States, energy efficiency (EE) policies/regulations were first 
proposed in the late 1970s after the Arab oil embargo to conserve energy. Since then, EE 
has become an important policy analysis issue among various researchers and policy 
makers. Benefits from EE are manifold, from the reduced electricity bill to the improved 
environment.  Numerous government policies/regulations have been implemented at the 
federal and/or state level to promote EE. Immediately after being sworn in as U.S. 
Energy Secretary, Dr. Ernest Moniz delivered his first remarks at the 2013 Energy 
Efficiency Global Forum, clearly expressing his determination to make EE a focal point 
during his tenure.   
The economic justification for government interventions is the belief that the 
actual EE level realized falls short of the social optimal level. The claimed cause for the 
EE gap is the existence of different market failures/barriers (Hirst & Brown, 1990; Jaffe 
& Stavins, 1994; Santad & Howarth, 2004; Golove & Eto, 1996; Reddy, 2003; Valentova, 
2010; Davis, 2010; Brown, Chandler & Lapsa, 2010; Allcott & Greenstone, 2012).  
However, there are still heated debates over both the existence and the magnitude of this 
presumed EE gap among researchers from diverse disciplines, which further raise 
concerns over the cost effectiveness of current government interventions.  
The crux of the engendered debates lies in disentangling market barriers and 
market failures, both of which can cause the perceived low EE investment rate in some 
circumstances. There are many barriers to EE investment which affects the energy 
efficiency level; however, not all of them produce market failures which influence the 
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economic efficiency level. Since energy efficiency itself is not our ultimate goal, we only 
promote energy efficiency to the extent that increases economic efficiency, which decides 
the net social welfare or the efficient allocation of resources (Sutherland, 1994). 
Therefore, removing all market barriers is neither feasible nor desirable, and only the 
existence of market failures provides a prima facie basis for government intervention.  
Market failures identified from literature include distorted energy price (a.k.a.  
“energy use externality”), imperfect information about EE opportunities, principal-agent 
problem (a.k.a. “misplaced incentives” or “asymmetric information”), credit constraints 
(a.k.a. “liquidity constraint” or “capital constraint”), etc. Those market failures are mostly 
tangled with other market barriers which are not market failures, like consumers’ risk 
management (i.e. uncertainty over future energy price), consumer heterogeneity (i.e. 
different preference over EE attribute), high transaction cost, etc.  It is challenging to 
separate those two groups of factors, and sometimes, it is even hard to distinguish the 
effect of one market failure from another since different market failures might be 
interconnected with each other and reinforce each other. 
This dissertation is dedicated to providing some insight into the current discussion 
over the EE gap. Three papers are developed targeting three closely related questions 
regarding residential energy efficiency and consumption. The first paper examines the 
part of the EE gap which was explained in literature as a result of one specific market 
failure, the incentive problems between landlords and renters. The paper compares the EE 
investment rates between these two groups of households while controlling for factors 
that are potential market barriers.  The second paper investigates how the EE investment 
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behavior influences the usage behavior. Specifically, the paper explores households’ 
choices of energy efficient dishwashers and their potential impact on dish washing 
behaviors. The last paper models the per capita demand for four main fuels in the 
residential sector, especially the rising demand for electricity over time given the 
technological progress.  
 4 
2 Residential Energy Efficiency Investment: Homeowners versus Renters  
2.1 Introduction 
Why do households use inefficient appliances or under insulate their living units 
when investing a reasonable amount for energy efficiency (EE) upgrades would save 
them money in the long run by reducing utility bills? Although there is little consensus on 
the answer to this question, misaligned/misplaced/split incentives
1
 between parties 
involved in energy-related investment decision-makings have been persistently pointed 
out as one main obstacle to residential EE improvements (Hist & Brown, 1990; Jaffe & 
Stavins, 1994; Brown, 2001; Sullivan, 2009; Valentova, 2010; Maruejols & Young, 
2011). Incentive problems typically occur in renter-occupied housing units
2
, where 
landlords can influence the EE levels of the housing units either due to their ownership 
over some energy-related investments or the existence of utility-included rental contracts.  
In a lot of energy literature, split incentives between landlords and renters were 
believed to cause the lower EE investment rate and consequently higher energy use 
intensity in renter-occupied housing units (Murtishaw & Sathaye, 2006; IEA, 2007; 
Gillingham, Harding & Rapson, 2012). According to the Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey (RECS) conducted by the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) in 2009, approximately 31.49% of housing units in the U.S. were renter-occupied, 
where the average energy consumption per capita per square foot is nearly 65.88% higher 
                                                 
1
 In some articles, these problems are also described as the Principal-Agent problems or Asymmetric 
Information Problems. 
2
 Some researchers pointed out that incentive problems could also happen between homeowners and home 
builders. For more information, see Murtishaw & Sathaye (2006). 
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compared to owner-occupied housing units
3
. Davis (2010) compared appliance 
ownership patterns between homeowners and renters in the United States.  He inferred 
that if renters and homeowners were equally likely to have EE appliances, more than 9.4 
trillion BTUs energy could have been saved every year.  
Great saving potentials appear to exist and could be realized just by making rental 
properties as energy efficient as those of homeowners. If that is the case, then why are 
rational individuals, landlords and/or renters, not racing forward to reap these benefits? In 
other words, if misaligned incentives are the sole causes, then why are the two parties 
involved not trying to remove these barriers and collect the presumed profits?  To provide 
some insights into those problems, this paper will use a subset of 2009 RECS and 
examine energy-related investment patterns in living units of homeowners versus renters. 
 The study explains the aforementioned problems from a contracting perspective 
and justifies a large part of the existing difference in EE investment patterns as a result of 
high contracting costs. Due to the existence of hidden contracting costs, renters and/or 
landlords make rational choices to invest less in EE at rental units because of the renter’s 
high mobility and the characteristics of most EE investments.  Empirical analyses show 
that on average, homeowners have a 9.88% higher probability to possess EE appliances, 
after controlling for their climate, housing and personal characteristics. The magnitudes 
of those differences change from investment to investment and are generally smaller for 
portable appliances. To examine the impact from renters’ mobility, the paper compares 
the probabilities to have EE investments between homeowners with long-term tenants. 
                                                 
3  This number is computed from data collected from the 2009 Residential Energy Consumption Survey. 
Sampling weights are supplied by Energy Information Administration and employed in the calculation.  
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The results show that the average difference shrinks by 74% and homeowners are only 
2.58% more likely to have EE investments compared with long-term tenants.   
 In literature, most researchers interpret the wide disparity of energy-related 
investment patterns between owner-occupied and renter-occupied housing units as solid 
evidence of inefficiencies caused by incentive problems.  They used existing differences 
to make inference for the promising energy savings achievable by solving the problems 
(Murtishaw & Sathaye, 2006; IEA, 2007; Davis, 2010; Wilkerson, 2012). To check the 
validity of those methods, this paper also investigates how much of the existing 
differences can be explained by the incentive problems.  
Given that the ownership status over most investments in rental units cannot be 
identified from the data, the paper will only focus on the incentive problem caused by 
utility-included rental contracts. By comparing the average probabilities to have EE 
investments between homeowners with renters who need to pay their energy bills, the 
study illustrates that most of the differences shown previously between the two groups 
still exist. The magnitudes of the probability differences do not change much with only a 
0.15% drop on average, which implies that utility-included rental contracts do not 
contribute much to the perceived differences. Among the appliances included in this 
study, light bulb is specifically mentioned to be installed by households and therefore 
also free from the incentive problem caused by landlords’ ownership over the appliance. 
This investment is not influenced by any incentive problem. Yet, analyses demonstrate 
that even the difference for this investment only decrease by 0.14%. To further examine 
how utility-included rental contracts influence the investment behaviors of landlords 
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and/or renters, the paper provides analyses comparing average probabilities to have EE 
appliances between renters paying their monthly utility bills and renters with utility bills 
included in rents. No significant differences are found, except for a minute difference 
with refrigerators.    
 Results from this study indicate that incentive problems caused by utility 
payment arrangements are neither the whole reason nor an important one for the existing 
differences in EE investment patterns between owner-occupied living units and rental 
units. Yet various empirical works assume the magnitude of the differences reflect energy 
savings achievable by addressing these incentive problems. As a result, estimated saving 
potentials by those works are exaggerated and trying to eliminate the difference by 
aligning the incentives would fall short of the goal desirable. Additionally, incentive 
problems have been frequently used as a justification for some energy efficiency policies 
(IEA, 2007; Doris, Corchran & Vorum, 2009; Convery, 2011; Cluett and Amann, 2013). 
If the associated saving potentials are exaggerated, then cost benefit analyses for those 
policies are questionable. Moreover, various existing energy efficiency policies are 
influencing households’ energy-related investment behavior. Some policies directly 
contribute to the EE gap between living units of homeowners versus renters (as will be 
explained in part 2.2). Therefore, a more thorough and in-depth understanding of all 
potential causes for the existing differences is needed to enable accurate cost 
effectiveness analyses of related government policies. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2.2, the paper 
incorporates both incentive and contracting perspectives to investigate different 
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investment patterns in living units of homeowners versus renters. This section outlines 
the three groups of implications to be tested based on the initial analyses. Section 2.3 
introduces the dataset and econometric models for the study. Section 2.4 compares the 
probabilities to make EE investments between different groups of households to verify or 
test some of the implications based on the preliminary analyses. Section 2.5 concludes.  
2.2 Misaligned Incentives versus Contracting Costs 
2.2.1 Incentive Problems & Government Policies.  
2.2.1.1 Two different incentive problems.   
Incentive problems occur when landlords are the owners of energy-related 
investments. In rental housing properties, renters obtain the temporary rights to use the 
assets through contracts (Handerson & Ioannides, 1983). Therefore, for those energy-
related assets, renters are not the ones who decide their energy efficiency (EE) attributes 
directly but need to pay the incurred energy bills. In this case, landlords represent the 
interests of renters when making choices concerning some major appliances. Since 
landlords only need to pay upfront investment costs, they are not motivated to improve 
the energy efficiency in the housing units to reduce the operation costs borne by renters.  
Incentive problems also arise when renters have their utility costs included in their 
monthly rental payments. Since landlords are responsible for renters’ bills, renters are 
unresponsive to fuel prices and have little/no motivation to make any energy efficiency 
improvements or to conserve energy, resulting in over-consumption of energy. According 
to a study by Maruejols and Young (2011), households who were not obligated to pay the 
heating cost directly consumed more energy for heating.  This increased cost was caused 
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by increased thermal comfort and being less sensitive to surrounding or climate 
conditions when deciding on temperature settings. 
The two aforementioned incentive problems are also described as Principle-Agent 
problems in energy literature, which are market failures, caused by asymmetric 
information and split incentives between landlords and tenants. There are numerous 
studies demonstrating the pervasive existence of these two different types of Principal-
Agent problems in rental units, and a variety of government interventions have been 
suggested to tackle those potential market failures (Murtishaw & Sathaye, 2006; Davis, 
2010; Maruejols & Young, 2011; Gillingham, Harding & Rapson, 2011).  
2.2.1.2 Three Groups of Government Policies.  
Various government intervention plans have been proposed because of the 
inefficiencies claimed to be caused by incentive problems and the alleged energy saving 
potentials in the residential sector from increased efficiency. Those interventions are 
supposed to narrow the existing EE gap and promote the overall EE level in the U.S. 
residential sector. In this section, the paper categorizes existing policies related to the 
investment patterns of homeowners and/or renters into three big groups, according to the 
underlying incentive mechanism. A brief summary is provided for each group and 
whether they will influence the investment behavior of homeowners and renters 
differently
4
.  
The first group uses financial incentives to motivate households’ EE investment 
behavior and normally applies to homeowners. Since those policies are only able to 
                                                 
4
 Note: Due to data constraint, the influences from different policies will not be incorporated in the study 
and treated as exogenous in later estimation. 
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stimulate the EE investments in owner-occupied housing units, they could also be a 
potential cause for the EE gap between living units of homeowners and those of renters. 
Policies in this group include all kinds of subsidies, rebates, grants, loans, tax credits, etc. 
Take the Residential Energy Efficiency tax credit as an example, this program was first 
established by the Energy Policy Act in 2005, later on reinstated by the Energy 
improvement and Extension Act of 2008, and further extended by the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009 and 2010. The program expired at the end of 
2011 and then was renewed again in 2012 by the American Tax Relief Act. According 
this tax credit, if a household makes EE improvements for the building envelope of 
existing homes or purchases high-efficient heating, cooling and water-heating equipment 
in 2011, 2012 or 2013, they are eligible to claim a cumulative maximum amount tax 
credit as high as $500. However, the program specifically mentions that those efficiency 
improvements or equipment must serve a dwelling that is owned and used by the 
taxpayer as primary residence, which excludes the eligibility of renters and landlords 
(Residential Energy Efficiency Tax Credit, 2013). 
The second group of policies tries to increase the EE level by cutting off options 
that are not energy efficient. This will force landlords to make some EE investments 
since the non-EE options are no longer available. Thus, those policies have the potential 
to solve the incentive problem occurring when landlords own some of the investments 
but do not need to pay the bills. This group includes many types of building codes and 
appliance standards. In California, the State Building Standard Code (also known as Title 
24) includes standards of energy efficiency that all constructions of homes and buildings 
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have to maintain to enhance energy conservation (Macken, 2013). California also 
implemented new light bulb standards on January 1, 2011 requiring all light bulb 
manufacturers to meet new efficiency standards. In the new standards, “any former 100-
watt light bulb manufactured on or after January 1, 2011 and sold in California will have 
to use 72 watts or less. The 72-watt replacement bulb will provide the same amount of 
light (called “lumens”) for lower energy cost” (New Light Bulb Standards, 2013). The 
standard was passed by Congress and became nationally effective on January 1, 2012.  
The third group includes policies designed to raise households’ awareness of the 
energy consumption associated with different choices to facilitate their decision-making 
process. This group provides renters with information concerning the EE level of rental 
units, thus potentially motivating landlords’ EE upgrade activities to attract prospective 
renters and narrow the EE gap between owner-occupied and renter-occupied housing 
units. Policies in this group are comprised of different information disclosure strategies, 
including all kinds of information programs (e.g. rating & labeling programs) and energy 
use disclosure policies. According to Cluett and Amann (2013), there are approximately 
14 jurisdictions with policies in place mandating residential energy use disclosure in the 
United States. In Chicago, the City Council passed an ordinance on September 11, 2013, 
requiring landlords to become more transparent and list the energy their buildings/rental 
units use so they could measure up against their peers.  
However, there are potential downsides associated with government interventions. 
Energy subsidies could crowd out priority public spending and reduce private 
investments (International Monetary Fund, 2013); mandatory energy efficiency standards 
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would override consumers’ preference/choices and undermine their general well-being 
(Gayer & Viscusi, 2013); and information disclosure might end up useless since there are 
gaps between information and knowledge, between knowledge and opinion, between 
opinion and attitude, and also between attitude and behavior (Lutzenhiser, 1993/2008; 
Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek & Rothengatter, 2005; Barr & Gilg, 2007; Ehrhardt-Martinez & 
Latitner, 2009). Therefore, without valid evidence or accurate measurement of the 
claimed problems, the benefits of costly interventions will be questionable.  
2.2.2 A Contracting Perspective. 
2.2.2.1 Contracting Costs. 
Whoever owns the appliance or pays the utility bills would be totally irrelevant to 
the final investment patterns in rental units in an ideal world consisting of zero 
contracting costs (or transaction cost in a broad sense). According to Coarse Theorem, 
landlords and tenants can negotiate effectively and the outcome will always be 
economically efficient. In real-world economic situations, different obstacles to 
bargaining prevent efficient Coasian negotiation and various costs will be incurred to 
make efficient contracts.   
From the landlords’ perspective, they need to be able to internalize any costs 
incurred by renters in the rental contract, including both the wear/maintenance costs and 
the energy costs from using appliances. Monitoring how households treat appliances and 
appraising the associated wear/maintenance costs is technically difficult and quite 
expensive.  Landlords would by default expect a higher wear/maintenance cost resulting 
from renters’ careless usage behavior. Therefore, unless landlords can reasonably charge 
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tenants this cost, rational landlords are reluctant to invest in the comparatively more 
expensive EE products for rental units. Evaluating the amount of energy consumed by 
renters normally can be achieved at a reasonable price. However, for multi-family 
buildings where several rental apartments share a master meter, this cost can also be 
prohibitively high. From the renters’ perspective, contracting costs arise when they try to 
verify whether the alleged benefits from existing EE investments in rental units deserve a 
relatively higher rent.  This verification is usually done by checking the old energy bills 
from the previous occupants or the current status of the living units, which is costly in 
terms of the time and effort.      
Since “Parties are likely to trade off the cost of creating complex contracts against 
the gain that these contracts create by inducing efficient investment incentives” 
(Schwartz & Watson, 2001), landlords and renters normally end up adopting simple 
contract forms which are suboptimal ex post,  leaving untapped a lot of energy efficiency 
investments that have proven positive long term net benefits. Utility-included rental 
contracts are forms typically adopted in practice. Levinson & Niemann (2004) explained 
the existence of this apparent inefficiency in from both the demand and the supply sides. 
The demand-side explanation is that renters value the utility-included arrangements 
because they are risk-averse, or dislike volatile utility bills, or simply prefer not to face 
marginal costs during consumption.  The supply-side explanation is that landlords value 
this type of rental contracts due to the high sub-metering costs, economies of scale in 
master-metered apartment buildings, or because they use it to signal the energy efficiency 
of the rental units to validate a higher rent. 
 14 
2.2.2.2 Characteristics of Different EE Investments. 
 Due to the existence of contracting costs, landlords and renters make their 
investment decisions independently for the rental units.  Each party chooses the most cost 
effective options after comparing the characteristics of different choices. Therefore, final 
investment patterns in renter-occupied living units are collaborative efforts from both 
parties, which will be different from those of homeowners where only one decision 
maker exists. Three main characteristics of the investments are related, those being 
upfront cost, operation costs and relocating costs.  Those aforementioned characteristics 
influence investment decisions in living units of homeowners and renters differently due 
to the uniqueness of those two groups, especially renters’ comparatively higher mobility.  
For households (homeowners or renters) who are making investment decisions for 
their living units and responsible for the utility bills, they try to choose the most cost-
effective options by comparing the upfront costs and the expected lifetime operation costs 
between those EE options with other conventional but less-efficient counterparts. Given 
that most EE investments involve a higher upfront cost and lower operation cost, if they 
are not easily/cheaply transferable, then households are required to live in the current 
housing units long enough to recover the extra upfront cost through utility bill savings 
from increased efficiency. Therefore, there are time concerns for some EE investments to 
be the most cost-efficient ones. Since homeowners normally live in the same place much 
longer than renters, they are less confined by time constraints and more likely to make EE 
investments. 
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For landlords to make EE investments on behalf of renters, they need to 
internalize any involved costs into the charged condominium fees.  Usually, the upfront 
cost is transparent to both parties and thus can be incorporated in rent payments. 
However, there is also operating cost involved. For investments like insulation and 
window glass, the operating cost is just the maintenance (wear) cost which can be 
predicted since the cost is independent of households’ behavior and caused by the natural 
depreciation/aging process. In this case, landlords will make the EE investment if EE 
attributes are valued or if landlords are paying energy bills. For other investments, like 
energy efficient appliances, operating cost includes the energy cost and the maintenance 
(wear) cost, both of which can be difficult to monitor. Energy cost for appliances is 
normally easy to monitor and charge except when multiple living units share one meter, 
in which case renters involved usually either share the bill by dividing it equally or have 
their bills included in their rents. Both circumstances will lead to households’ 
opportunistic behavior since individual household’s energy use behavior is invisible. In 
this case, renters are not motivated to make investments that improve energy efficiency. 
Landlords are only inclined to make the EE investments if they are responsible for the 
monthly utility bills. Maintenance (wear) cost for EE appliances depend on renters’ daily 
usage behavior and this is utterly impractical to observe or charge, giving rise to renters’ 
reckless usage behavior and discouraging landlords from investing in a more expensive 
EE appliance. 
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2.2.2.3 Characteristics of Households. 
Households are the ultimate decision makers and their eventual investment 
behavior determines the resulting patterns. Therefore, to enhance our knowledge of the 
existing residential EE investment patterns, we also need to understand the underlying 
determinants of households’ EE investment behavior. 
 In literature, EE investment behavior (also referred as “efficiency behavior” or 
“purchase behavior”) is normally classified as one of two types of energy-related 
behavior and often studied with the other subcategory, the usage (or “curtailment”) 
behavior (Raaij & Verhallen, 1982; Gardner & Stern, 2002; Attari, Dekay, Davidson & 
Bruin, 2010; or Zhao, 2013). There are diverse approaches to understanding energy-
related behavior of households, resulting in different groups of factors identified to be 
accountable for the varying behavior patterns from household to household (Moezzi and 
Lutzenhiser, 2010).  
At the macro level, technology development, economic growth, demographic 
characteristics, institutional factors and cultural development were recognized as the 
foremost determinants of energy related behavior (Gatersleben & Vlek, 1998). However, 
those determinants are almost impossible to capture or change in the short run. Current 
research has been focused on different variables influencing energy-related behavior at 
the micro level (i.e. individual or household level). For instance household income, 
energy price, family size, education, number of children, type of dwelling, rural/urban 
location, etc. are all being analyzed. (Heslop, Moran & Cousineau, 1981; Schipper, 
Bartlett, Hawk & Vine, 1989; Allen & Janda, 2006;  Santin 2011). In this paper, some of 
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those key determinants at the micro level will be incorporated into the modeling for 
different EE investment behavior (See section 2.3.1.3)
5
. 
2.2.3 Testable Implications.   
Given the analysis above, there are three groups of testable implications for 
empirical work: 1). Will differences in probabilities to have EE appliances between 
owner-occupied units and rental units persist after controlling for household 
characteristics?  2). Will the differences become smaller if we compare living units of 
homeowners and renters who need to pay their monthly utility bills? How about renters 
who pay their monthly energy bills and those who have their bills included in rent? 3). 
Will we get a substantially smaller difference in the probabilities to have the EE 
appliances between living units of long-term tenants and homeowners? How about long-
term renters vs. long-term homeowners, or short-term renters vs. short-term 
homeowners? 
2.3 Data and Econometric Models 
2.3.1 Data.   
2.3.3.1 Data Source. 
                                                 
5
 It is noteworthy that there are also significant amounts of related works which are not from the field of 
economics, but instead from energy-related literature or environment & behavior studies. Consequently, 
some of those factors identified in literature as determinants of energy-related behavior are qualitative in 
nature and hard to quantify or incorporate into economic models. For example, based on the energy 
cultures research project in New Zealand from 2009 to 2012, Barton et al. (2013) concluded that norms, 
material culture and energy practices all contribute to households’ energy behavior. In particular, 
achievement-related values are strongly correlated with households’ EE behavior, while family and friends 
are influential in their behavior change. Clearly, those variables are hard to put figures on. Factors like 
those that were found to be linked to energy behavior also include attitudes, social networks, personal 
lifestyle, social recognition, etc. (Staats, Harland & Wilke, 2004; Staats, Harland & Wilke, 2004; 
Uitdenbogerd, Egmond, Jonkers & Kok, 2007; Druckman & Jackson, 2008; Lawson, Mirosa, Gnoth & 
Hunter, 2010; Mirosa, Lawson & Gnoth , 2011).  For a detailed list of identified determinants from all 
reviewed studies, refer to Appendix A. 
 18 
Data used in this paper are micro data from the 2009 Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey (RECS). RECS is a periodic survey administered by U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) with a nationally representative sample of housing 
units. The survey was first conducted in 1978. The latest one, the 13th iteration of the 
RECS program, was conducted in 2009 and the final version of data was released in 
January 2013. The 2009 survey used a multi-stage probability design to select samples 
and included housing units from all 50 States and the District of Columbia. Altogether 
there were 12,083 households selected to represent the 113.6 million housing units 
occupied as primary residence in the United States. Information concerning energy 
characteristics on the housing unit, usage patterns, and household demographics was 
collected by specially trained interviewers. The dataset also includes consumption and 
expenditure data obtained from energy suppliers. 
2.3.3.2 Dependent variables. 
This paper is devoted to the comparison of EE investment patterns in housing 
units for homeowners and renters.  All the dependent variables are discrete, the weighted 
frequencies for which are listed in table 2.1. In the original data set, there are 12,083 
households, including owner (67.31%), renters (31.49%), and occupants who are not 
paying the rent (1.21%). Since the study is only interested in the choices of owners and 
renters, the last group is omitted and the final sample size becomes 11,941. In addition, 
for investments on EE appliances, only households who have at least one corresponding 
appliance are included. For example, when analyzing the investment behavior on clothes 
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washers, we only include households who have at least one clothes washer at home. The 
Sampling weights applied are provided by EIA.  
As we can see from Table 2.1, the percentages of U.S. households using energy 
efficient appliances are greater than 50% in most cases. The only exception is for 
refrigerators and only about 40% of the households have an energy efficient one. In Table 
2.2, we compare the percentage of homeowners who have energy efficient appliances in 
their living units versus that of renters. As expected the results conveyed that 
homeowners have much higher EE investment rates than renters without controlling for 
any other exogenous variables. On average, the percentage of households having EE 
appliances at home is about 22% higher for homeowners than renters.  It is also worth 
mentioning that the differences are inversely related with the mobility of the appliances, 
from about 11% between the two groups of households for energy efficient light bulbs to 
approximately 37% for energy star dishwashers.  
2.3.3.3 Independent variables. 
In section 2.2.2.3, the paper summarized the identified determinants for energy-
related behavior in reviewed studies.  This paper does not include all of them as control 
variables, because some are qualitative in nature and cannot be quantified accurately, like 
people’s attitude towards environment. A detailed description of included independent 
variables is located in Table 2.3. Summary statistics are not provided since observations 
are different for different investments. For each investment decision, we only include 
households who answered the corresponding question clearly, excluding nonresponses or 
 20 
those with “don’t know”. Additionally, each sample only includes those who have at least 
one corresponding appliance no matter if it is energy efficient or not. 
2.3.2 Discrete Choice Models.   
This study focuses on households’ EE investment behavior, which is 
characterized by their choices involving appliances used in the housing units. Although 
some of choices are not made by households directly, we still assume those choices 
reflect their utility or preference since they chose the living units as bundles, including 
assets inside and their EE attributes. Given that consumers’ investment behavior involves 
decisions among a number of alternatives, discrete choice models are applied in this 
study. To fit in the discrete choice framework, the choice set must be composed of 
alternatives that are finite, mutually exclusive, and collectively exhaustive, all of which 
are satisfied by the investment decisions in this study.  
Since investments in this study are associated with two-level choices (yes or no), 
the binary logit model is employed. Either the household has the EE appliance (recorded 
as “1”), or the household’s appliance is not EE (coded as “0”). For those binary logit 
models, we assume households’ preferences can be represented by the random utility 
function (U), which is deterministic (V) for household but contains elements (ϵ) that are 
not unobservable to the investigators. For observation i to choose option j, we have 
            (2.1) 
where Uij gives the utility level of i-th observation making the j-th choice, and ϵij is 
assumed to identically, independently and Gumbel distributed. Household i will choose 
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option j over option k if a higher utility is associated with choice j (Uij>Uik). Thus we can 
write the probability of i-th individual to choose alternative j as 
  ( )   (       )   (               )   (               ) (2.2) 
Since ϵij and ϵik have Gumbel distributions, the difference ϵik-ϵij has a logistic 
distribution (Bierlaire, 1997). Therefore, the probability can also be written as following:                                                                    
  ( )   (       ) (2.3) 
where F is the cumulative logistic distribution function. For Vij, we assume a linear-in- 
parameters functional form, Vij =Xijβ, where Xij is a row vector of exogenous variables 
and β is a column-vector of parameters to be estimated. The likelihood function can be 
written as:   
       
    ( )
        ( ) 
      (2.4) 
where n is the number of observations. Yi=1 when agent i chooses option j, and 0 if 
otherwise. The corresponding Log-likelihood function for the model can be written as: 
    ∑      (  ( ))  (    )  (    (  ( ))) 
 
   
 (2.5) 
which can be maximized to obtain estimates of β or other parameters of  interest.  
2.4 Three Groups of Tests 
Using the binary logit model specified in Section 3, the study will test the three 
groups of implications listed in section 2.3. Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit tests 
together with different Pseudo-R
2
s are used to check the fitness of the binary logistic 
models.  Besides the estimation of coefficients β, the primary interest of the paper is to 
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calculate the marginal effects and compare the average probabilities to have different EE 
appliances between different groups of households.  
2.4.1 Implication one: will differences in probabilities to have EE appliances 
between owner-occupied units and rental units persist after controlling for 
household characteristics?   
To test implication 1, we will use the binary logit model and compare the 
probabilities to make the EE investments between homeowners and renters, while 
controlling for their climate, housing and personal characteristics (See Table 2.3). This is 
accomplished by calculating the marginal effect from variable OWNER for each 
observation and then calculating the average. Results are summarized in Table 2.4. This 
test serves as the base case and will be compared with the other tests.  Light bulbs, energy 
star window/wall AC, refrigerator, clothes washer and dish washer are all household 
appliances which may or may not exist in some housing units, especially renter-occupied 
housing units. Consequently, the study only includes households that have at least one 
appliance in the housing unit for the estimation of each corresponding investment. 
Table 2.4 summarizes differences in the average probabilities to have EE 
investments in living units of homeowners versus renters. According to the results, 
homeowners have higher probabilities to have EE investments except for energy star 
windows/wall ACs, in which case, probabilities are not significantly different between 
the two groups of households. Furthermore, the differences are significantly smaller in 
comparison to those shown in Table 2.2 when we do not control for exogenous variables. 
Now the probabilities to have EE investments are on average 9.88% higher for 
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homeowners than renters compared with 22% found previously in Table 2.2. This implies 
that household characteristics may be held accountable for a portion of the differences in 
the investment patterns in living units of homeowners versus renters. 
To further understand how household characteristics influence investment 
decisions, we refer to the complete results for all five binary logit models in Appendix B 
for light bulbs, Appendix C for ACs, Appendix D for refrigerators, Appendix E for 
clothes washers, and Appendix F for dish washers.  Although parameter estimates for 
binary logit models are not marginal effects, the signs of all estimates indicate whether 
corresponding control variables have positive or negative effects on the dependent 
variables. According to the results, signs of the influences from most household 
characteristics change from investment to investment. However, a few are fairly 
consistent for all investments. For example, age of householders has a significant effect 
on all investments. The probabilities of having EE appliances increases with 
householder’s age as shown by the positive sign of variable HHAGE for all investments, 
and then decrease with the age as revealed by the negative sign of variable SAGE 
(=age*age) for all investments. In addition, energy price has no significant effect on any 
investment decision while household income has a positive impact on all investments 
except for light bulbs, where income effect is not significant.   
2.4.2 Implication two: will the differences become smaller if we compare 
living units of homeowners and renters who need to pay their monthly utility bills? 
How about renters who pay their monthly energy bills and those who have their 
bills included in rent? 
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According to the 2009 RECS, among households who gave valid responses, a 
significant proportion of those surveyed have their energy bills included in rental 
payments or condominium fee, or paid by relatives, rental or condominium agents, or 
some other party. For electricity, the percentages of households that don’t need to pay 
fuel consumption directly are: 5.09% for space heating, 4.85% for water heating, 5.04% 
for cooking, 3.77% for air conditioning, and 6.14% for lighting or other appliances. For 
natural gas, the percentages of households that don’t need to pay the fuel consumption 
directly are: 10.07% for space heating, 12.10% for water heating, and 10.97 % for 
cooking. In addition, 2% don’t need to pay propane consumption, and 19.8% don’t need 
to pay fuel oil consumption. Most of those households are renters who have their energy 
bills included in their rents. In particular, 83% households who do not pay the electricity 
consumption are renters, 86.6% of those who do not pay the natural gas consumption 
directly are renters, 78.51% of those who do not pay the fuel oil directly are renters, and 
78.51% of those who don’t pay the propane consumption directly are renters. 
To test the first question of implication 2, we select observations exactly as we 
did previously for testing implication 1, then we restrict the sample for each investment 
to households who are responsible for monthly energy bills. In table 2.5, the differences 
in probabilities to have EE appliances between homeowners and renters who need to pay 
their monthly utility bills are calculated. Comparing these results with the base case for 
implication 1, the magnitudes of most differences only decline slightly (0.15% on 
average), which indicates that the presence of utility-included rental contracts is not a 
main cause of the existing difference in EE investment patterns between owner-occupied 
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and renter-occupied housing units. The most interesting part of the results is derived from 
investment in EE light bulbs. This investment is specifically mentioned to be made by 
households and thus not suffering from the incentive problem due to landlords’ 
ownership over them. Since we already restrict the sample to those who pay the monthly 
utility bills directly, this investment is free from any incentive problem. However, from 
table 2.5, we notice that homeowners are still 3.21% more likely to have this EE 
investment.  
Addressing the second part of implication 2, we select observations as previously 
for implication 1, and then we select the sample for each investment by including renters 
only. Results are summarized in Table 2.6.  According to the table, the probabilities to 
make/have most of the EE investments by renters who need to pay the monthly energy 
bills directly are not significantly different from those by renters who have their bills 
included in the rents. The only exception is for refrigerators, where renters who do not 
pay their energy bills directly on average have a 3.63% higher probability to own an 
energy efficient one.  This can be explained by the fact that a large proportion of 
refrigerators in rental units are preinstalled by landlords before renters move in. When 
landlords are responsible for the energy bills, they are motivated to make the energy 
efficiency investments for renters.      
2.4.3 Implication three: will we get a much smaller difference in the 
probabilities to have the EE appliances between living units of long-term tenants 
and homeowners?  
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Renters do not usually reside in the same place as long as homeowners do, and 
thus are less likely to make EE investments that involve high upfront costs and are costly 
or impossible to be transferred to new place when they move out. According to the 2009 
RECS, about 50.6% of the U.S. homeowners live in their current residence at least 10 
years and around 71.62% at least 5 years, while for renters, only 11.18% live in the same 
place at least 10 years and 24.02% at least 5 years.  To test implication 3, we select 
observations as previously for testing implication 1, and then we restrict our samples to 
households who moved in before 2000. In other words, only those who lived in the 
current housing units for at least 10 years are included in the samples. 
Table 2.7 summarizes differences in the average probabilities to have EE 
appliances between homeowners and long-term tenants who lived in the current residence 
for at least 10 years, after controlling for household characteristics. From the table, we 
observe that the differences shown previously in test 1 for EE light bulbs and dishwashers 
are not significant anymore. The magnitudes fall dramatically for the two investments 
that had significant differences from 17.69% to 5.76% for refrigerator and from 11.57% 
to 7.13% for clothes washer. Compared with test 1, the EE gap between living units of 
homeowners and renters shrinks by 74%. On average, homeowners are only 2.58% more 
likely to have EE appliances. 
Regarding changes in all differences compared with test 1, there are two plausible 
explanations. First, renters are more likely to make EE investments if they can harvest all 
the potential benefits from increased energy efficiency. This could happen when renters 
can easily relocate the investments, like light bulbs, which are fairly portable. The 
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scenario could also occur when the life expectancies of the EE investments are short and 
the renters live in the same place long enough, like dish washers, the average life 
expectancy for which is less than 10 years. For refrigerators and clothes washers, they 
both are rather cumbersome in terms of the size and weight, and have long the life 
expectancies, 13
6 
and 10 years respectively (NAHB, 2006). Another plausible 
explanation is that the landlords are more likely to replace those appliances with energy 
efficient ones after their usage period due to the mutual trust developed over time 
between landlords and tenants.  
In order to gauge the importance of a households’ mobility, the paper includes 
two additional tests.  Those tests compare the probabilities of possessing EE appliances 
between long-term homeowners versus long-term tenants (Table 2.8) and between short-
term homeowners versus short-term tenants (Table 2.9).  Results convey small 
differences in the probabilities associated with long-term homeowners versus long-term 
tenants, yet there are notable differences between short-term homeowners and short-term 
tenants. According to Table 2.8, long-term homeowners have an averaged 3.43% higher 
probability to have all EE appliances. In contrast, Table 2.9 reveals that short-term 
homeowners are on average 10.15% more likely to have all EE appliances. 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this paper, energy-related investment patterns in living units of homeowners 
versus renters are investigated. In energy literature, the existing differences in EE 
investments between those two types of living units are explained as inefficiencies caused 
                                                 
6
 Here we use the life expectancy for a standard refrigerator. For compact refrigerator, the life expectancy is 
9 years. 
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by two types of incentive problems. These incentive problems have been used in the 
justification for ratification of various energy policies. Using a different perspective, this 
study vindicates the differences as households’ rational choices due to the existence of 
contracting costs.  
The previous literature only has performed a few quantitative studies. In these 
studies, the authors normally divide the households into four groups according to the 
existence of the two types of incentive problems. Then they calculate the potential energy 
savings by multiplying the number of households in each group affected by the problem 
and the difference in energy consumption of those groups compared with base case. 
Some of those aforementioned studies were conducted by agencies who were involved in 
the government EE programs. However, this study concludes that different efficiency 
investment patterns between several groups of households are caused by various factors, 
including household characteristics and attributes of EE investments.  In particular, 
renters’ high mobility appears to account for a large part of the resulting difference in EE 
investments between owner-occupied and renters-occupied housing units. Therefore, 
quantitative studies that exclude those factors are biased and the estimated energy savings 
are exaggerated. 
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3 Choices of Energy Efficient Dishwashers and the Demand for Dishwashing 
3.1 Introduction 
How much energy can be saved from improved energy efficiency? This appears 
to be a technical question that is to be answered by engineers. Provided the specific 
estimate of the percentage efficiency increase, we should be able to approximate the 
percentage savings achievable. While the logic sounds plausible, this approach is flawed 
due to behavior changes from consumers or producers in response to perceived 
technological progress. Specifically, this behavior adjustment in energy consumption can 
be summarized as increased marginal product of energy causing decreased marginal cost 
of energy service and therefore driving up the quantity demanded of the service. This 
direct effect
7
, triggered by increased energy efficiency on consumers’ usage behavior, 
causes the realized energy savings to fall short of the expected engineering estimates and 
can even result in more energy consumption in specialized cases (Brookes, 2000; 
Saunders, 2000; Alcott, 2008).    
The increased utilization of energy services induced by energy efficiency was 
introduced by William Stanley Jevons in his famous work entitled “The Coal Question of 
1865” when he observed that more economical use of coal from the invention of more 
efficient steam engines in Britain did not reduce national coal consumption, but rather led 
to increased coal demand and ultimately a higher coal consumption level (Jevons, 1865). 
From this point forward, the effect from energy efficiency on energy service demand has 
garnered attention from researchers in varied disciplines. Although there is a general 
consensus on the existence of this effect, the estimated magnitude of the effect from 
                                                 
7
 This direct response has been called “direct rebound effect” in various energy literatures.  
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empirical works is controversial due to the high diversity in terms of the definitions, 
methodologies and data sources (Greening, Greene & Difiglio, 2000; Sorrell, 
Dimitropoulos & Sommerville, 2009; Tuner, 2013).  Additionally, a majority of studies 
were focused on a few energy services – namely personal automotive transport, 
household heating and cooling. For other energy services, like the usage of household 
appliances, empirical studies are limited.  
In this paper, the author provides empirical estimates of consumers’ changes in 
dish washing behavior from having energy efficient dishwashers. Within the framework 
of household production theory, the study examines this change by investigating how the 
choices of energy efficient dishwashers influence households’ average dish washing 
frequencies per week, while controlling for various household characteristics. The 2009 
Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) data is employed in the empirical 
analysis. Since the recorded outcomes for this usage behavior from the survey are 
discrete and ranked, an Ordered Probit model is applied to analyze the behavior. To 
confront the endogeneity problem caused by the fact that households might choose to 
have energy efficient appliances simply because they want to use it more frequently, two-
stage residual inclusion
8
 (2SRI) is used to make the estimation (Lee, 2007; Terza, Basu & 
Rathouz, 2008; Cai, Small & Have, 2011). Results show that households with energy 
efficient dishwashers are 1%-3% more likely to report frequent usage behaviors in the 
survey compared with those without. This approximates 7.7% more frequent usage or 
                                                 
8
 2SRI is a special case of the Control Function (CF) approach. For more details on the CF approach, see 
Heckman & Robb (1985) and Newey, Powell & Vella (1999). 
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about 0.24 additional dishwashing times per week compared with those using standard 
dishwashers. 
There are two main causes for the lack of research on household appliances. First 
and foremost, a lot of empirical studies estimate the direct effect from energy efficiency 
on service utilization with the elasticity of demand for energy consumption of the related 
service with respect to the energy price (Sorrel, Dimitropoulos, and Sommerville ; 2009). 
This approximation results from the difficulty associated with measuring energy 
efficiency or energy service directly and is based on the assumption that households’ 
responses to efficiency increases are identical as the price of energy decreases. However, 
in the residential sector, households usually only have one energy bill and sub-metering 
energy use for each appliance is costly and sometimes technically difficult. Consequently, 
obtaining appropriate data for research on specific appliances becomes challenging and 
deters research in this subfield. Secondly, modeling energy use behaviors with existing 
data is not easy either, especially due to an endogeneity problem. Although various two-
stage models have been developed to alleviate this problem for linear or nonlinear models, 
a longstanding, common obstacle for this approach is the lack of appropriate instrumental 
variables. Finding instruments of good quality is a cumbersome and challenging process. 
The efficiency of the instruments will directly impact the consistency of the final results.   
In this study, the author conducts a selection process by evaluating the first stage 
Probit model with and without a mixture of potential instrumental variables. Those 
instrumental variables all correlated with households’ choices of energy efficient 
dishwasher but do not directly influence their weekly dish washing frequencies. By 
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comparing different goodness-of-fit measures from the first stage, the final model 
chooses a combination of three different instrumental variables. By including those 
instruments in the first stage model, the Pseudo-R
2
s increase by twice on average 
compared with the base case without any instrument. To deal with the trade-off between 
the goodness-of-fit of the model and the complexity of the model, the paper also 
compares the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz criterion (SC) for different 
fist-stage models. Those two criterions give the minimum values for the best model. By 
including the three chosen instrumental variables, the AIC and SC values both decrease 
by 18%. 
As compared with refrigeration, lighting, or heating, the author expects the 
demand for dish washing to be more elastic due to the existence of an immediate 
substitute – hand washing. Therefore, this paper serves as a representative case for home 
services with close substitutes, the demands for which are more elastic and the author 
expects more significant behavior changes.  Among the few empirical works examining 
residential appliances, Davis (2008) found that an average household increased clothes 
washing by 5.6% after receiving the energy efficient clothes washers. This behavior 
change means the actual energy savings from improved energy efficiency are 5.6% less 
than engineering calculations. To control the endogeneity problem, David (2008) used 
data from a field trial in which households received energy efficient clothes washer for 
free. For residential lighting, the increased usage was estimated to range from 5% to 100% 
(Roy, 2000; IEA, 2005; Tsao, Saunders, Creighton, Coltrin & Simmons, 2010). Most of 
 33 
the aforementioned studies were not contained in economic literature and did not even 
consider potential endogeneity problems.  
Dishwashers are a unique major household appliance because it is not installed in 
all households and traditionally installed more frequently in higher income households. 
Given the increasing living standards in U.S., we would expect a large amount of 
marginal consumers who would begin to use this service, because the increased energy 
efficiency means a lower operation cost for using dishwashers. This is also true for most 
major appliances in developing countries, where there is an excessive amount of potential 
demand (Orasch & Wirl, 1997; Roy, 2000; Herring & Roy, 2007; Bergh, 2011).  Due to 
the data constraint, increased utilization of this service by those prospective consumers is 
not examined in the study. Consequently, the computed magnitude of the increased 
consumption from this paper is more conservative compared with the potential size. 
 Besides the direct effect investigated in this paper, the entire effect from the 
efficiency improvement on consumers’ energy consumption behavior also includes the 
indirect effect and the general equilibrium effect 
9
(Greening & Greene, 1997). 
Indirect/Secondary effect results from increased real income due to decreased price of the 
energy service/output. Since consumers have more disposable income, they can consume 
                                                 
9
 To help understand the mechanisms underlying the (rebound) effect, researchers usually decompose the 
(rebound) effect into separate parts.  The most commonly used typology is from the early work of Greening 
and Greene (1997). There are also lots of other different typologies for the (rebound) effect. In the later 
work from Greening, Greene and Difiglio (2000), for example, they distinguished four types of the 
(rebound) effect: direct, secondary fuel use, market clearing price and quantity adjustments, and 
transformational effects. Sorrell (2007) simplified the (rebound) effect into two types: direct and indirect, 
and then categorized the indirect effect into five types in his later work (Sorrell, 2009). There are also 
studies trying to explain it either in terms of consumption versus production (Schettkat, 2009), or from the 
short run versus the long run (Small & Van Dender, 2005). Although there is no general agreement on the 
classification of the (rebound) effect, all of them agree on the part of direct (rebound) effect and thus almost 
all the empirical work that has been done was trying to measure the direct (rebound) effect, especially in 
the residential sector. 
 34 
more of other services/output whose production or usage also involves energy 
consumption (Greening, Greene & Difiglio, 2000). For example, consumers use the 
money they saved from using energy efficient appliances to purchase additional 
electronic goods, which also require energy as an input. The general equilibrium effect, 
also known as market effect, dynamic effect, structural effect, or economy-wide effect, 
refers to macro level reactions from both the demand and the supply sides in all markets 
due to the increased energy efficiency. Neither indirect nor general equilibrium effects 
are included in this study. Therefore, the effect referred to in this paper is only the direct 
effect and the whole effect from energy efficiency on energy consumption could be much 
larger than results presented in this study.    
This paper explores the direct effect from using energy efficient dishwashers on 
the quantity demanded for dish washing service while controlling for factors such as 
energy price, gross household income, frequencies that hot meals are cooked, whether 
household members are at home on a typical week day, and additional household 
characteristics which may also affect the usage frequencies. In the next section, the paper 
describes the household production theory and makes the initial predictions on consumers’ 
behavior changes from increased energy efficiency. Section 3.3 develops an ordered 
Probit model for households’ dishwasher usage behavior and illustrates how to control 
the endogeneity problem with 2SRI.  Section 3.4 discusses the summary statistics for key 
variables, the selection of instrumental variables and the final results of the estimation. 
Implications and conclusions remarks of the research will be contained in Section 3.5 and 
Section 3.6. 
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3.2. Household production with Dishwasher  
In accordance with the commercial and industrial sectors, energy is considered as 
an input in the residential sector. Households cannot consume energy or appliances 
directly. Instead, households are producers who combine energy, appliances, and other 
inputs together utilizing diverse household production functions to supply different 
energy services. Those aforementioned services are the final consumption goods 
appearing in the forms of clean dishes/clothes, light, temperature controlled homes, 
cooked meals, etc. Unlike the commercial or industrial sector, the producers (households) 
are also the consumers of the outputs. Those produced energy services satisfy households’ 
desire for the basic amenities and will appear as arguments in their utility functions 
(Dubin & McFadden, 1984; Quiqley, 1984; Klein, 1988; Davis, 2008).  
This paper investigates households’ production of dish washing services. Inputs 
include energy (E), dishwasher (D), and other factors involved (O), while outputs are the 
clean dishes (Z1) and can be measured indirectly through dish washing frequencies 
(DISHUSE). Let f(•) denotes the household production function, Pe the energy price, K 
the fixed capital cost of the dishwasher , Po the average price of other inputs, and Ps 
output price.  As producers, households’ problem can be summarized as a profit 
maximization problem:  
      
          
          (3.1) 
                
         
                     (3.2) 
    
         
       (   )                 (3.3) 
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First-order conditions for this maximization process with respect to E (equation 3.4) and 
O (equation 3.5) are: 
   
  (   )
  
                
(3.4) 
   
  (   )
  
                
(3.5) 
Where MP represents the marginal product of energy (MPe) or other inputs (MPo) with 
respect to the production function (f(•)).  
 Rearranging terms, we can re-express the first-order  conditions as: 
   
  
   
 
  
   
 
(3.6) 
Compared with standard dishwashers, energy star dishwashers have higher MPe and 
MPo
10
(see footnote 10 for explanations for higher MPo ). Therefore, the real price for the 
service (Ps) is lower compared with the standard dishwashers, holding the energy price 
and other input prices constant.                                                     
As consumers, households maximize utility by choosing their optimal 
consumption level of the service (Z1) and all other goods, which are defined as a 
composite good (Z2).  The composite good (Z2) is assumed to be a numéraire with price 
normalized to be one. Prices for dishwashing services are defined as Ps for energy 
efficient dishwashers and Ps’ for standard dishwashers, where Ps<Ps’. Given a household 
income M and liner budget equations, we have the budget constraints for using energy 
                                                 
10
 Other inputs for dishwashers normally include water, time, and dish soap. Besides saving energy, energy 
star dishwashers are also 20% more water efficient compared with the standard models.  
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efficient dishwashers (equation 3.7) and for using the standard dishwashers (equation 3.8) 
as shown below: 
           (3.7) 
  
          (3.8) 
Denote household’s utility function U (•) and two Lagrange multipliers 𝛌 and 𝛌’. 
Now, the households’ problem as consumers can be simplified as equation (3.9) for using 
energy star dishwashers and equation (3.10) for using the standard dishwashers:  
   
       
   (     )   (          ) (3.9) 
   
       
   (     )    (           ) (3.10) 
The paper further assumes that both Z1 and Z2 are normal goods and households have 
strictly convex indifference curves (ICs). Compared with those choosing standard 
dishwashers, households using energy star dishwashers will increase the consumption of 
both Z1 and Z2. This is caused by households’ utility-maximization behavior and the 
decrease of service prices from Ps’ to Ps. Specifically, both the substitution effect and the 
income effect will move the optimal consumption bundle of rational households with 
energy star dishwashers towards the direction with a higher level of dish washing 
services (Z1). Therefore, we can conclude the analysis in section 3.2 as increased energy 
efficiency of dishwashers making dish washing service cheaper and therefore driving up 
consumption of this service. In section 3.3 and 3.4, we will verify this conclusion and 
show how the demand of this service changes from having energy star dishwashers with 
empirical data. 
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3.3 The Econometric Model 
3.3.1 Data Source.   
The study is based on data from the 2009 Residential Energy Consumption 
Survey (RECS). This survey is administered by U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) with a nationally representative sample of housing units.  First conducted in 1978, 
the 2009 version represents the latest iteration of the RECS program and the final version 
of the data was released in January 2013. The 2009 survey used a multi-stage probability 
design to select samples and included housing units from all 50 States and the District of 
Columbia. Altogether there were 12,083 households that were selected to represent the 
113.6 million housing units occupied as primary residence in the United States. Since this 
paper is investigating households’ dishwasher usage behavior, only those with 
dishwashers are included in the analysis, which accounts for 61.09% of the original 
sample units. By further excluding those without valid answers
11
, the final sample is 
comprised of 4684 observations. 
3.3.2 The Ordered Probit Model.   
The utilization of the dish washing service can be approximated by the 
dishwasher usage behavior. In the survey data, variable “DISHUSE” represents how 
often households use dishwashers every week.  The values for this variable are 
frequencies ranging from less than once a week, once each week, 2 to 3 times each week, 
4 to 6 times a week, to at least once a day. Considering those categorical responses are 
arranged in a meaningful sequential order, an ordered Probit model is applied to 
demonstrate households’ dishwasher usage behavior. In an ordered Probit model, an 
                                                 
11
 Households refusing to answer or giving an answer “don’t know” are not included in the sample. 
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underlying continuous latent variable “Y*” is assumed to exist reflecting the ordinal 
choices “Y” made by households. We can interpret Y* as a continuous measure of the 
usage behavior or the propensity to use the dishwashers. In order to quantify the effects 
of control variables included in the study, we will describe this measure Y* as a linear 
function of those factors with an additive error term.  
          (3.11) 
Where X1 is a vector of covariates that are predictive of the outcome, β1 is a column-
vector of parameters to be estimated and made inference from, and ϵ is a random term 
which is assumed to be independently, identically, and normally distributed N (0,σ2). 
Therefore, Y* is also normally distributed. 
            Furthermore, suppose we have m choices that households choose from to describe 
how often they use the dishwasher every week, we can assume that there are (m-1) cut-
off points C1, C2, C3……Cm-1 such that we have the following:  
Y=1 when Y*= X1β1+ϵ ≤C1 
Y=2 when C1<Y*= X1β1+ϵ ≤ C2 
Y=3 when C2<Y*= X1β1+ϵ ≤ C3 
………………………………. 
Y=m-1 when Cm-2<Y*= X1β1+ϵ ≤ Cm-1 
Y=m when Cm-1<Y*= X1β1+ϵ 
 
 
 
 
 
(3.12) 
Thus, the probability for the ith observation to make choice j can be written as: 
     (      )   (        ) (3.13) 
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where N is the cumulative normal distribution function. Accordingly, the likelihood 
function for the model can be written as:
         
   ∏∏   
   
 
   
 
   
 
(3.14)
 
where n denotes the number of observations, m represents the number of choices, and Zij 
is equal to 1 if Yi* falls within interval j (i.e. ith observation makes choice j), and 0 if 
otherwise. Taking the logarithms of the likelihood function, we can obtain the log-
likelihood function: 
    ∑∑    
 
   
 
   
   (   ) (3.15) 
It can be shown that this log-likelihood function is globally concave in the parameter 
vector β1, and therefore can be easily maximized to yield estimates of β1 or other 
parameters interested.   
3.3.3 Endogeneity Problem and 2SRI. 
All right-hand variables (X1) included above are exogenous except the dummy 
variable ESDISHW, which has a value of 1 if households use an energy-star dishwasher 
and 0 if otherwise (For better reference later, assume X1=X2+ESDISHW). Since 
households might self-select to have energy-star dishwashers because they planned to use 
them more often, there are potential endogeneity problems. Given the nonlinearity of our 
model, we use two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI), which extends the linear two-stage 
least square estimation to nonlinear models to deal with the endogeneity problem. 
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According to Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008), 2SRI generally gives consistent results 
for both linear and nonlinear models with endogenous treatments. 
For the first stage of 2SRI, we add instrumental variables (IVs) to estimate the 
reduced forms equations. The selection of IVs is included in part 3.4. In the final 
regression model, three selected instruments (IV) and covariates X2 are included as 
control variables. Since values for dependent variable (ESDISHW) are discrete choices (0 
or 1), the binary Probit model is applied.  In this model, we assume households have 
identical preferences and the preference is given by the random utility function: 
            (3.16) 
where Uij gives the utility level of i-th household making the j-th choice, and the ϵij are 
bivariate normally distributed N(0, Σ). Thus we can write the probability of i-th 
household making the j-th alternative as: 
  ( )   (
       
 
) (3.17) 
For Vij, we assume a linear-in- parameters functional form, Vij =Xijβ2, where Xij is a row 
vector of exogenous variables (i.e.  Xij =IVsij+X2ij) and β2 is a column-vector of 
parameters to be estimated. Usually, we normalize by setting σ=1. Let Yi be 1 if agent i 
choose alternative j and 0 otherwise. Therefore, we can derive the likelihood function for 
the model as: 
   ∏    ( )
        ( ) 
     
 
   
 (3.18) 
 Taking logarithms, we can obtain the log-likelihood function as 
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    ∑       (  ( ))  (    )  (     (  ( ))) 
 
   
 (3.19) 
which can be maximized to obtain estimates of β2.  
Given estimates of vector β2 , the generalized residuals (Gourieroux, Monfort, 
Renault & Trognon, 1987) for the Probit model can be computed as by:  
          (
 (    ̂ )
 (    ̂ )
)  (         )  (
 (    ̂ )
   (    ̂ )
) (3.20) 
where F(•) is the probability density function and N(•) is the cumulative density function 
for standard normal distribution.  
 In the second stage of 2SRI, instead of replacing the endogenous variables with 
their predicted values as in the case of two stage least-squares (2SLS) for linear models 
or two stage predictor substation (2SPS)
12
 for some nonlinear models, the first stage 
residuals will be included as additional regressors in the second stage regression. Now, 
we have the following structural equation: 
              (3.21) 
where X1 is a vector of covariates as defined above in the ordered Probit model, r is a 
vector of generalized residuals,β3 & γ are  column-vectors of parameters to be estimated 
and made inference from, and w is a random term which is assumed to be independently, 
identically, and normally distributed N (0,σ2).   
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables. 
                                                 
12
 According to Terza, Basu & Rathouz (2008), although both 2SPS and 2SRI are used to address 
endogeneity in nonlinear models, 2SRI is consistent and 2SPS is not in a generic parametric framework. 
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Two interesting variables in this study are households’ usage behavior 
(DISHUSE) and their choices of energy efficient dishwashers (ESDISHW). Both are 
categorical variables and summarized in Table 3.1. According to Table 3.1, among those 
who own dishwashers at home, 64.94% use the energy star dishwashers and 35.06% use 
the standard ones. Households’ dish washing behavior varies, with 13.64% observations 
using the dishwashers less than once a week , 13.46% once a week, 33.01% two to three 
times a week, 18.87% four to six times a week, and 20.99%  at least once every day. To 
have a preliminary view of the relationship between those two variables, we can look at 
the two-way frequency table (Table 3.2) of those two variables. As shown in Table 3.2, 
households using energy star dishwashers have higher proportions with more frequent 
dishwasher usage behavior, compared with those using standard dishwashers. However, 
without addressing the endogeneity problem or controlling for other exogenous variables, 
this seemingly high correlation between the two variables is meaningless as either the 
direction or the size can be determined.  
3.4.2 Selection of Instrumental Variables (IVs). 
In this paper, the endogeneity problem is caused by households choosing to have 
an energy efficient dishwasher because they are heavy users or an unforeseen 
circumstance will cause abnormal usage.  To solve this problem with 2SRI, we need 
instrumental variables, which are correlated with households’ choices of energy star 
dishwashers but won’t influence their usage frequencies directly. Since there is only one 
endogenous variable, we need at least one instrumental variable. Given the data available 
from the survey, there are four potential candidates that may serve this role.  
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The first candidate is variable “ESFRIG”. This variable represents whether 
households have an energy-star refrigerator. There are two ways that this variable can be 
correlated with households’ choices of energy-star dishwashers. Firstly, households may 
live in an energy-star certificated home. Data from the 2009 RECS does not include 
information on whether the household lives in an energy efficient home. However, one 
typical feature of those homes can be observed. That feature is the whole household 
contains an energy efficient package, equipped with efficient appliances, including 
energy-star certificated dishwashers, refrigerators, clothes washers, etc. (Energy Star, 
n.d.). Therefore the certification of other appliances may be a good indicator. Secondly, 
households may choose energy-star products simply because they have a higher value in 
energy efficiency or the energy-star label (Mirosa, Lawson & Gnoth, 2011; Barton, et al, 
2013). As a result, they may purchase more than one energy-star appliance. Since 
refrigerators are the only appliance that all U.S. households own at least one
13
 and it does 
not influence households’ dish washing behavior, variable “ESFRIG” can be a good 
instrument for the two aforementioned reasons.  
Three additional potential instrumental variables are “KOWNRENT”, 
“OCCUPYRANGE” and “YEARMADE”. “KOWNRENT” represents whether 
households are homeowners, renters or occupants without a rent payment. 
“OCUUPYRANGE” denotes the year-range that household moved in. “YEARMADE” 
stands for the year that the house was built. Those three variables are irrelevant to 
households’ dish washing behavior but could impact their choices of the dishwashers. In 
                                                 
13
 According to data from the 2009 RECS, approximately 99.8% U.S. households have at least one 
refrigerator in 2009. For other appliance, the percentages are much lower.   
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this paper, the main household characteristics are included in the models, controlling for 
the possible systematic difference between households choosing energy star dishwashers 
and those with standard dishwashers. However, according to Wang (2014), the 
probability to make energy efficiency investments is higher for homeowners than renters 
and for households living in the same place longer, even after controlling for their climate, 
housing and personal characteristics. Therefore, variable “KOWNRENT” and 
“OCCUPYRANG” could serve as valid IVs. The variable “YEARMADE” is also 
considered as a potential candidate given the belief that old homes are more likely to 
come with the energy inefficiencies inherent in these houses. However, this variable 
could influence the choices of energy efficient dishwashers in a different direction. The 
average life expectancy of dishwashers is 9 years. Therefore dishwashers in homes older 
than 9 years are more likely to get replaced with newer efficient ones. 
To provide further justification for suitable IVs, this study also conducts a 
selection process by comparing the efficiency of different first stage models with and 
without different IVs.  Given that the first stage model is contained in the class of logistic 
regression models, the study assesses the model fit by using three groups of goodness-of-
fit measures (Amemiya, 1981). The first group includes the Likelihood Ratio (R) and 
Upper Bound of R (U). Those two measures normally have bigger values for more 
efficient models. The second group includes 7 different Pseudo-R
2
s, such as Aldrich-
Nelson R
2
, Cragg-Uhler 1 R
2
, Cragg-Uhler 2 R
2
, Estrella R
2
, Adjusted Estrella R
2
, 
Mcfadden’s LRI R2 and Mckelvey-Zavonia R2. Long (1997) recommends the Mckelvey-
Zaoina Pseudo-R
2
 as the best fit measure for binary and ordinal probit/logit models. Since 
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the first stage model in this paper is a binary probit model, the magnitude of this measure 
is given more attention to during the selection process. The third group includes the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz criterion (SC). Those two criterions will 
consider the trade-off between the goodness-of-fit of the model and the complexity of the 
model. They give minimum values for the best model. 
The comparison of different first stage models is summarized in Table 3.3. 
According to the table, “ESFRIG” is the strongest instrument, which increases the 
efficiency of the first stage model significantly as indicated by all the goodness-of-fit 
measures. In particular, the Mckelvey-Zaoina Pseudo-R
2
 value increases by nearly 1.5 
times in size compared with the base case without any IV. Variable “KOWNRENT” and 
“OCCUPYRANGE” are shown as weak instruments that increase the efficiency of the 
first stage model to some extent. By including “YEARMADE”, there is no significant 
change in almost all goodness-of-fit measures, suggesting that variable “YEARMADE” 
may not be a good instrument in this case. By further adding different instruments in the 
first stage, the best fit is shown to be the combination of “ESFRIG”, “KOWNRENT” and 
“OCCUPYRANGE”.  By including those three instruments, the Pseudo-R2 values for the 
first stage model increase by twice on average compared with the base case, while the 
AIC and SC values both decrease by 18%. 
3.4.3 Empirical Results from 2SRI. 
In the first stage, three instrumental variables and twelve other control variables 
are used to model households’ choices of energy efficient dishwashers. Those twelve 
control variables include the energy price, 2009 gross household income, whether 
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household pays the energy bill, householders’ age, number of household members, 
number of meals cooked every week, whether household members stay home on typical 
week days, householder’s education level, whether householder lives with spouse or 
partner, householder’s race and gender. The energy price is computed by the ratio of total 
energy cost (in whole cents, 2009) to total site energy usage (in thousand BTU, 2009) for 
each household.   
The main results for the first stage regression are summarized in Table 3.4.  From 
the results, we notice that all instrumental variables are significant and thus are useful for 
the prediction.  In the second stage, explanatory variables include the residual term, 
ESDISHW, and the twelve control variables. Parameter estimates for the second stage are 
summarized in Table 3.5. Given all the small P values provided, we can conclude that all 
variables are useful for the prediction. In particular, the significance of the residual term 
confirms the existence of endogeneity problem.  
In both the first stage and the second stage models, the signs of the parameter 
estimates indicate whether the corresponding control variables have positive or negative 
effects on the dependent variables. For the first stage regression, a positive sign means 
that an increase in the control variable will lead to higher probability to have energy 
efficient dishwasher, while a negative sign indicates the higher value of the variable is 
associated with lower probability.  Likewise, in the second stage, a positive sign of the 
parameter implies that greater value of the variable will result in higher probability to use 
the dishwasher more often, while a negative sign reveal an opposite effect. In this study, 
we want to know how energy efficiency investment will influence the energy usage 
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behavior. In Table 3.5, we find the point estimate for ESDISHW being 1 (i.e. energy 
efficient dishwasher) to be “0.126528”. From the positive sign of the parameter estimate, 
we can conclude households with energy star dishwashers have higher propensities to use 
dishwashers more frequently, which verifies the initial prediction from the theoretical 
model.  
Besides directions of the effects, we are also interested in the magnitudes of the 
effects, which can be computed from the parameter estimates. In both the first stage 
binary Probit model and the second stage ordered Probit model, marginal effects (ME) 
are nonlinear functions of the parameter estimates and also values of all control variables. 
Therefore, MEs are not constant across observations. We can either calculate the overall 
marginal effect for an “average household”14 or take the average of MEs calculated for 
each observation. The latter has been adopted for this study. The average marginal effects 
for key variables are summarized in Table 3.6 for the first stage regression and Table 3.7 
for the second stage regression.  
From Table 3.6, we notice that the magnitude of the ME is the biggest for 
ESFRIG among three instrumental variables, further proving this variable being the 
strongest instrument. In particular, having an energy star refrigerator will increase the 
probability of owning an energy star dishwasher by 33.42% on average. If we choose 
homeowners as the base case, the probability to choose energy star dishwasher decreases 
by 11.18% on average for renters, confirming the conclusion from the paper of Wang 
(2014).  Additionally, the probability increases by 4.04% on average for households 
                                                 
14
 The “average observation” is created with values for all control variables equal to the means of those 
variables.  
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occupying the living units without payment of rent compared with homeowners. For 
instrumental variable OCCUPYRANGE, the positive MEs show the increased 
probabilities to have energy star dishwasher for each year range when households moved 
in, compared with the base case when households moved in between 2005 and 2009. The 
average ME for PRICE is 0.0156, indicating that the probability to have an energy star 
dishwasher increased by 1.56% for every 1 unit (cent/1000 BTU)15 rise in energy price.  
The income effect is much smaller, with an average ME of 0.1%. This ME indicates that 
for 1 unit (1000 dollars) increase in 2009 gross household income16, the probability to 
have energy star dishwasher only increase by 0.1%.  
In this paper, the main interest lies in the effects of having energy efficient 
dishwashers on the usage behaviors, which are the marginal effects of variable 
“ESDISHW” and are summarized in Table 3.7.  According to results in Table 3.7, 
compared with households without energy efficient dishwashers, those having energy star 
dishwashers are 2.38% less likely to use them less than once a week, 1.27% less likely to 
use them once each week and 0.68% less likely to use them 2 or 3 times a week, but 
about 1.05% more likely to use them 4 to 6 times each week and about 3.28% more likely 
to use them more than once a day. Obviously, having energy efficient dishwasher leads to 
more frequent usage behaviors. The price effect and the income effect are also included 
in Table 3.7. For a one unit increase in energy price (in cent/1000btu), households are 
0.74% more likely to use them less than once a week, 0.39% more likely to use them 
                                                 
15
 According to the 2014 Monthly Energy Review data from EIA, the average retail price of electricity in 
the residential sector in 2009 is 11.51 cents per kilowatt-hour, which is equal to 3.37 cents per thousand 
BTUs. 
16
 According to the Current Population Survey by U.S. Census Bureau, the median household income in 
2009 is approximately 53 thousand in 2012 dollars, which is about 50 thousand in 2009 dollars. 
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once a week and 0.21% more likely to use them 2-3 times a week, while are 0.33% less 
likely to use them 4 to 6 times a week and 1.02% less likely to use them more than once a 
day. To summarize, the higher the energy price, the less likely frequent usage behavior 
occurs. Income effects are in opposite directions from the price effects and much smaller 
in magnitudes. For every 1 unit increase in 2009 gross household income (in 1000 
dollars), households are 0.04% less likely to use them less than once a week, 0.02% less 
likely to use them once a week and 0.01% less likely to use them 2-3 times a week, but 
are 0.02% more likely to use them 4 to 6 times a week and 0.05% more likely to use them 
more than once a day. Evidently, the higher the gross household income, the more likely 
frequent usage behavior takes place. 
3.5 Implications  
Using the empirical results of this study, direct behavior response from choosing 
an energy star dishwasher is related with a 1%-3% higher probability of households using 
dishwashers more frequently. Needing a more straightforward understanding of this 
behavior change, we assign different weights to different usage frequencies.  This way, 
the paper can approximate the usage behavior under two distinct scenarios. Scenario 1:  
the average usage frequencies for households with energy star dishwashers and those 
with standard dishwashers, without controlling for any exogenous variables. Scenario 2:  
the average frequency changes caused by the choices of energy efficient dishwashers, the 
price effect and income effect on dishwashing behavior, after adjusting the endogeneity 
problem and controlling varied exogenous variables.  
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The weights are as follows: 0.5 for using dishwashers less than once a week, 1 for 
once a week, 2.5 for two to three times a week, 5 for four to six times a week, and 7 for 
more than seven times a week. Given the probability/percentage of each usage frequency 
in Table 3.2, the average usage frequency per week can be approximated by summing the 
weighted probabilities. The results are summarized in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9. According 
to Table 3.8, households with standard dishwashers use the appliance about 3.119 times 
per week or 162.118 times per year. Using Table 3.9, the average usage frequency of 
households using energy star dishwashers is approximately 3.615 times a week or 
187.972 times a year. So the difference is about 0.50 extra dishwashing times a week or 
25.78 times a year if we do not control for the endogeneity problem or other exogenous 
variables.  
Provided the marginal effects computed in Table 3.7, we can estimate the 
expected changes in dishwashing behavior from purchasing energy star dishwashers 
while controlling for exogenous variables discussed in Section 3.4. Those marginal 
effects are the probability changes associated with each usage frequency category. 
Therefore, we estimate the expected changes by summing up the weighed probability 
changes. The results are summarized in Table 3.10. According to Table 3.10, having an 
energy star dishwasher causes households’ to increase dishwasher usage by 0.24 
dishwashing times per week or 12.50 times per year, indicating a 7.7% increase 
compared with standard dishwashers. In order achieve the “energy star” certification, 
dishwashers are required to be 10% more energy efficient than non-qualified (standard) 
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models (Energy Star, n.d.).  Therefore, the behavior change from increased efficiency 
will offset a large proportion of the predicted engineering savings.  
By using Table 3.7 and including the weight for each frequency range, we also 
estimate the price effect and income effect, which are summarized in Table 3.11and 
Table 3.12 respectively. According to Table 3.11, raising the energy price by 1 unit (in 
cent/1000BTU), households will decrease their usage by 0.0749 dishwashing times a 
week or 3.895 times a year. According to the 2014 Monthly Energy Review Data from 
EIA, the 2009 average retail price of electricity in U.S. is approximately 11.51 cents per 
kilowatt-hour (EIA, u.d.). This is equivalent to 3.37 cents per 1000 BTU, the unit used in 
this paper. Consequently, 1 unit increase in energy price indicates approximately a 30% 
rise in the price. According to Table 3.12, for 1 unit increase in the 2009 gross household 
income (in 1000$), the average dishwashing times increase by 0.004 per week or 0.2077 
times a year. According to the Current Population Survey by U.S. Census Bureau, the 
median household income in 2009 is approximately 53 thousand in 2012 dollars, which is 
around 50 thousand in 2009 dollars. Therefore, 1 unit increase in 2009 Gross household 
income implies a 2% increase in the household income.  
3.6 Conclusions  
In this paper, household production theory is employed to make initial predictions 
on households’ behavior responses to increased energy efficiency. In the empirical 
analysis, we focus on residential dishwasher usage. An ordered Probit model is developed 
to estimate a household’s demand for dishwashing services and how their demand is 
influenced by choices of energy efficient dishwashers. Two-stage residual inclusion is 
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applied to solve the endogeniety problem. This issue arises because households may 
choose to have energy efficient dishwashers because they plan to use them more 
frequently. Particularly, to find valid instrumental variables for this two stage approach, 
the paper conducts a selection process by comparing the efficiency of different first stage 
models. 
 Using the 2009 U.S. residential household survey data, the study finds evidence 
consistent with our initial predictions. Households containing energy star dishwashers 
have a 1% to 3% higher probability of using dishwashers more frequently compared with 
those containing standard dishwashers. This change indicates a 7.7% higher usage 
behavior or nearly 12.5 additional dishwashing times per year compared with household s 
using standard dishwashers. With an estimated 10% energy savings from using an energy 
star dishwasher, this behavior change will offset a great proportion of the predicted 
engineering savings.   
This paper investigates consumers’ behavior alterations after the introduction of 
new technology that improves the efficiency of resource use. Due to data constraints, this 
investigation is carried out by comparing dishwasher usage behaviors between 
households with energy star dishwashers and those without, keeping households’ key 
characteristics constant. A potential improvement could be made by implementing a 
before-after comparison on the same group of observations. Additionally, as pointed out 
in Section 3.1, this study only focuses on the direct effect on dishwasher users caused by 
an increase in energy efficiency. Future research can also explore the indirect effect, 
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general equilibrium effect, or expand the sample by including households without 
dishwashers. 
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4 U.S. Residential Energy Consumption: two opposing trends 
4.1 Introduction 
There are two main opposing trends that affect residential energy demand. One is 
steady increases in energy-based living standards lured by rising household income, 
which stimulates households’ energy consumption. The other trend is more efficient 
energy use worldwide boosted by the emerging energy efficiency technologies and 
enforcing energy efficiency policies, which have been significantly reducing households’ 
energy consumption. These aforementioned trends shape residential energy demand 
worldwide and result in different patterns in countries. The patterns vary over time during 
different time periods within a specific country. In the United States, per capita 
residential energy consumption increased steadily from 1940s to 1960s.  From 1970s 
forward, the energy consumption has remained stagnant (See Figure 4.1).  
In this paper, the author focuses on the steady period of residential energy 
consumption in the United States.  Using a panel data set covering 48 contiguous states 
and ranging from 1970 to 2008, the study models residential demands for “four”17 
different fuels. Fuel prices, per capital income, climate factors, time trend, and cross-state 
heterogeneity are all controlled. Double-log demand models are applied and two-stage 
residual inclusion is employed to address the price endogeneity. The results discover 
positive income effects and negative own price effects. Various cross price elasticities are 
analyzed and suggest potential substitution or complementary effects between different 
fuels. Additionally, the paper illustrates that per capita electricity consumption increases 
                                                 
17
 In this paper, three main fuels are investigated, including electricity, natural gas and LPG. The study also 
aggregate the consumption of wood, fuel oil, kerosene and solar as one category, because only a small 
proportion of the households use them. Therefore, altogether, demands for “four” fuels will be analyzed. 
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over time, after controlling for exogenous variables. This result is difficult to explain 
because of the technological progress and thus more efficient electricity use in the 
residential sector. In order to explain this curious result, the paper examines multiple 
household level survey data between 1970s and 2000s. Two potential explanations are 
provided. First, data demonstrates that even though electricity-consuming products 
become more efficient over time, households increase their fuel consumption by 
purchasing additional electronics and appliances at home. Second, besides energy 
efficiency, households desire different attributes over time. Those attributes usually 
increase energy consumption and offset the expected savings from increased energy 
efficiency. 
Residential sector is one of the four major sectors
18
  that consume energy at the 
point of end use. Residential energy consumption is considered a driving force behind the 
underlying energy demand worldwide. According to data from U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), 18% of world marketed energy was consumed in the residential 
sector in 2011, with generally higher ratios in developing countries and lower ratios in 
developed countries (Dzioubinski & Chipman, 1999; Chow, Kopp & Protney, 2003). 
Energy use in the residential sector as a proportion of total energy consumption has been 
growing slowly but steadily in the United States since the late 1940s. Residential energy 
consumption averaged 19% of total energy consumption from 1949 to 1969, 20% from 
1970 to 1990, and reached 21% from 1991 to 2012
19
. Fuels commonly used in the 
                                                 
18
 The U.S. Department of Energy breaks down national energy consumption into four broad sectors: 
industrial, transportation, residential, and commercial. 
19
 Those proportions are calculated from data in the Annual Energy Review of EIA released on February 
26, 2014.  
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residential sector include electricity, natural gas, propane/liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), 
wood, fuel oil, kerosene and solar. According to the  2009 Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey (RECS) conducted by EIA, among the 113.6 million homes 
included in the survey, 100% used electricity, 61% used natural gas, 43% used 
propane/LPG, 11.5% used wood, 6.7% used fuel oil, 1.5% used kerosene, and only about 
1% used solar. Natural gas, petroleum and electricity are the three main fuels consumed 
in the residential sector. Electricity is the only one with full penetration among U.S. 
households and becomes the focus of this paper.  
Acquiring sound knowledge of residential energy demand and its determinants is 
of crucial importance for predicting future resource requirements, environmental impacts, 
and developing energy related policies. Recently, the US residential energy demand 
literature has focused on state level panel data to analyze the aggregate energy demand or 
the demand for a single fuel, mainly electricity, using econometric modeling techniques. 
Alberini and Pilippini (2010) estimate residential electricity demand using panel data for 
48 states over the period 1995 to 2007 and apply a dynamic partial adjustment model 
using the Kiviet corrected LSDV and the Blundell-Bond estimator. Filippini and Hunt 
(2010) estimate the US residential energy demand and energy efficiency using data for 48 
states over the period 1995 to 2006 with a stochastic frontier model. Paul, Myers and 
Palmer (2009) also use state-level panel data spanning January 1999 through December 
2006 to estimate electricity demand by region, season and sector using a partial 
adjustment model estimated in a fixed-effects OLS framework. Neeland (2009) analyzes 
US residential electricity demand through an ADF unit root test, Johansen test and a 
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rolling regression with panel data for the period 1970 to 2007. Additional related studies 
on US residential electricity demand include Dergiades & Tsoulfidis (2008) using a 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration technique and Horowitz (2007) 
using a counterfactual difference in differences estimator to estimate energy efficiency 
program commitment impacts. 
According to a thorough review by Swan and Ugursal (2009), most researchers 
were modeling energy demand either through a top-down approach based on historical 
information or a bottom-up approach utilizing historical or detailed input information at 
household level. In this paper, the author investigates households’ demand for different 
fuels by exploring various residential energy consumption data, including both state level 
panel data and multiple household level micro time series data. The paper is organized as 
follows. Section 4.2 models residential energy demands for “four” main fuels. Section 4.3 
investigates potential explanations for increasing demand of electricity presented in 
section 4.2, after controlling for various exogenous variables. The conclusions are 
contained in Section 4.4.  
4.2 Residential Energy Demand by Fuels 
4.2.1 Econometric Models. 
4.2.1.1 Double-Log Demand Model. 
This paper employs the double-log regression to estimate residential demands for 
different fuels. The functional form can be represented as following:  
         (4.1) 
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where y is the per capital fuel consumption in logarithmic form, x is a vector of 
explanatory variables most of which are in logarithmic forms, β1 is a vector of 
parameters, and w is the error term, which is assumed to be identically, independently 
and normally distributed.  
In this study, dependent variables (y) are the per capita demand for four different 
fuels, including electricity (ESRCB), natural gas (NGRCB), LPG (PARCB), and other 
fuels as one category (OFRCB). The same independent variables (x) are employed to 
make all the estimations. Among the control variables included, fuel prices (P)
20
, per 
capital income (PerY), heating degree days (HDD) and cooling degree days (CDD) are 
used in their logarithmic forms. Two additional control variables are the time trend (T) 
and a state dummy (D). Time trend (T) is used to capture the technological progress over 
time and the state dummy (D) is applied to deal with the cross state heterogeneity. 
4.2.1.2 Price Endogeneity and 2SRI.   
All independent variables are exogenous except fuels prices (P) due to their 
simultaneity with consumptions. Given the nonlinearity property of our model, we use 
two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI), which extends the linear two-stage least square 
estimation to nonlinear models to deal with the endogeneity problem. According to 
                                                 
20 Price vector P include price of electricity (ESRCD), price of natural gas (NGRCD), price of LPG 
(PARCD) and the price of other_fuels (OFRCD). Price of other_fuels (OFRCD) is defined as the average 
price of other fuels used in the residential sector and is calculated as: OTRCD= (TERCV-ESRCV-
NGRCV-PARCV)/(TERCB-ESRCB-NGRCB-PARCB), where TERCV is the total energy expenditures in 
the residential sector, ESRCV is the total electricity expenditure in the residential sector, NGRCV is the 
total natural gas expenditure in the residential sector, PARCV is the all petroleum products total 
expenditures in the residential sector, and TERCB is the total energy consumed by the residential sector. 
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Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008), 2SRI generally gives consistent results for both linear 
and nonlinear models with endogenous regressors. 
In the first stage of 2SRI, we add instrumental variables (IV) to estimate the 
reduced form equations. Four endogenous variables are included, price of electricity 
(ESRCD), price of natural gas (NGRCD), price of LPG (PARCD) and price of other fuels 
(OFRCD). Therefore, at least four IVs are needed to address the endogeneity problem. 
Variables chosen as IVs are either production side variable from the same year or 
consumption side variables from the previous year. Both types of IVs impact fuel 
supplies and equilibrium fuel prices but do not influence households’ fuel demands.  
Ten IVs are included. They are coal production (CLPRB), biomass inputs for the 
production of fuel ethanol (EMFDB), natural gas marketed production (NGMPB), 
electricity produced from nuclear power (NUETB), crude oil production (PAPRB), 
renewable energy production (PEPRB), consumption of electricity from previous year 
(LAGESRCB), consumption of natural gas from previous year (LAGNGRCB), 
consumption of LPG from previous year (LAGPARCB), and consumption of other_fuels 
from previous year (LAGOFRCB). In the first stage regression, independent variables 
include IVs and control variables from the second stage. The reduced form equation can 
be displayed as following: 
              (4.2) 
where P is a vector of endogenous prices, αandβ2 are vectors of parameters, IV is a 
vector of instrumental variables, and ϵ is the random error term. By applying ordinary 
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least squares (OLS) regression method, we can obtain consistent estimates of αand β2. 
The residuals (r) can be computed by: 
     ̂       ̂    (4.3) 
In the second stage of 2SRI, first stage residuals will be included as extra 
regressors in the model. Now the following simple linear demand/structural equation 
holds: 
            (4.4) 
where r is a vector of residuals andγis a vector of parameters. OLS can be applied to 
perform the estimation.  
4.2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics.  
4.2.2.1 Data Source.   
The main interest of this section is to explore the underlying factors influencing 
U.S. residential demands for different fuels.  The estimation is based on panel data, which 
covers 48 states and ranges from 1970 to 2008. The 48 states included are restricted to 
the contiguous states (i.e. Alaska and Hawaii are excluded). All energy data are obtained 
from the US Energy Information Administration database called States Energy Data 
System. Population and per capital personal income are acquired from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis of the US Census Bureau. The Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) is 
compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and is based upon a 1982-1984 Base of 100. 
Heating and cooling degree days are obtained from the National Climate Data Center at 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
4.2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics. 
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Descriptive statistics for key variables in the demand equations are summarized in 
Table 4.1. All prices (i.e. ESRCB, NGRCB, PARCB and OFRCB) and income (PerY) in 
Table 4.1 are adjusted for inflation and in real 1982-1984 dollars. From the table, we 
notice that both the standard deviation and the range of per capital electricity 
consumption (ESRCB) are smaller in size compared with other fuels, indicating a 
relatively stable consumption. However, the price of electricity (ESRCD) appears to have 
additional fluctuation, with larger standard deviation and range than other prices. It is 
also worth mentioning that the mean price of other fuels (OFRCD) is much smaller than 
prices of electricity, natural gas or LPG. This is caused by the fact that a large proportion 
of this aggregate category is consumed with no cost. Most variables used in the model are 
in logarithmic forms. Table 4.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for key variables in 
logarithmic forms contained in the demand equation. 
Descriptive statistics for instrumental variables are summarized in Table 4.3. This 
paper recodes IVs that have a value of 0 in some of the states over the entire 1970 to 
2008 periods as dummy variables. Those recoded variables are coal production (CLPRB), 
biomass inputs for the production of fuel ethanol (EMFDB), natural gas marketed 
production (NGMPB), electricity produced from nuclear power (NUETB) and crude oil 
production (PAPRB).  
 4. 2.3 Empirical Results. 
4.2.3.1 First Stage Results.  
First-stage regressions are employed to model four fuel prices. Parameter 
estimates are included in Appendix G for electricity price, Appendix H for natural gas 
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price, Appendix I for LPG price, and Appendix J for other-fuels price. Most IVs are 
significant for all four regressions, indicating strong correlations between those IVs with 
prices. The fit of the models is supported by the medium to high R-Squares obtained from 
outputs, with values equal to 0.8390, 0.7835, 0.6480 and 0.5313 respectively.  
4.2.3.2 Second Stage Results.   
Second-stage regressions estimate per capita demand for electricity, natural gas, 
LPG and other fuels as one category. Detailed parameter estimates can be found in 
Appendix K for electricity, Appendix L for natural gas, Appendix M for LPG, and 
Appendix N for other-fuels. The goodness of fit for those models is validated by the 
fairly high R-Square values: 0.9502, 0.9754, 0.9352, and 0.9247 respectively. Results 
from the second stage include four parts: elastricities, time trend, state dummy and 
residual terms. State dummy demonstrates significant effects in all cases, indicating the 
existence of cross state heterogeneity. The significance of the residual terms confirms the 
existence of the price endogeneity. For the elasticities and time trend, more detailed 
analyses are provided in the following paragraphs. 
Table 4.4 summarizes all elasticity terms. Per capita demand of electricity, natural 
gas and other fuels all have negative own price elasticities. These elasticities represent the 
percentage decrease in demand for a one percentage increase in their own prices. 
According to the table, demand for natural gas is relatively elastic with the own price 
elasticity greater than 1 in absolute value, while demands for electricity and other fuels 
are rather inelastic with elasticities less than 1. Own price elasticity for LPG is not 
significant. Income elasticities are all positive, indicating the percentage increase in 
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demand for a one percentage increase in per capita income. Electricity, natural gas and 
other fuels are necessity goods with income elasticity less than 1, while LPG is shown as 
a luxury good with income elasticity greater than 1. Elasticities with respect to HDD or 
CDD are positive in all cases, revealing the percentage increase in demand for a one 
percentage increase in HDD or CDD. The table also contains all cross price elasticities 
between different fuels. Cross price elasticities are the percentage change in the per capita 
demand of a specific fuel for a one percentage increase in the price of another fuel. 
Usually, a positive cross price elasticity value identifies two fuels as substitutes and a 
negative value indicates two fuels as complements. 
The time trend variable is used to capture the influence from technological 
progresses on per capita fuel demand after excluding effects from fuel prices, per capita 
income, CDD, HDD, and state heterogeneity. For natural gas and other fuels, time trend 
variable does not show any significant effect. For LPG, the time trend has a significant 
negative effect. This makes sense because LPG, primarily propane, is widely used as a 
fuel for heating and cooking. Heating and cooking devices are becoming more energy 
efficient due to technological progress and thus help reduce the consumption of related 
fuels. However, the time trend variable for electricity consumption has a positive effect.  
These results appear to contradict our expectations because of   rising efficiency in both 
home electronics and electricity-consuming appliances. Section 4.3 will further 
investigate this unforeseen result by using the micro level household data. 
4.3 Residential Electricity Consumption: two opposing trends 
4.3.1 Increased Efficiency. 
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Electricity is used in innumerable ways in a household, from the refrigerator in 
the kitchen, the TV in the living room, the water heater in the basement, to the electric 
lawn mower outdoors. Electricity is the most versatile energy source and the only fuel 
consumed by every U.S. household. Over time, electricity has been used more and more 
efficiently at home, empowered by ongoing advances in energy-saving technologies and 
enforcing energy efficiency policies both at federal and state levels. 
The thermal envelopes of U.S. homes are designed and constructed to be more 
energy conservative. The term ‘thermal envelope” refers the outside shell of the building 
and it prevents the wanted heat transfer between the inside living space and the outside 
environment. New homes are more likely to have improved insulation, more energy-
efficient windows, well-sealed doors, and so on, all of which reduce the energy required 
to heat or cool the homes. According to data from the 2009 Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey, around 35% of U.S. households use electricity as the main fuel for 
space heating and 100% use electricity for air conditioning.  Therefore, increased 
efficiency in residential thermal envelope helps reduce the electricity consumption. 
 Efficiency programs and policies related to the thermal envelopes include various 
building codes, constructions codes, building ratings and disclosures, etc. Although most 
of those programs and policies are not mandatory at the federal level, a lot of states 
choose to adopt them voluntarily and enforced them at state level. For example, in 
California, all new homes are required to meet minimum energy efficiency standards 
contained in Title 24 since 1978. This Title specifies the mandatory measures regarding 
home insulation, roof, window, thermal mass, etc.  
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Second, electronics and household appliances consume less electricity than 
previously produced comparable models because of yearly improvements in energy 
efficiency. Based on historical data published by the Association of Home Appliance 
Manufacturers (AHAM), from the year 1981 to 2011, energy efficiency has increased by 
46% for room air conditioner, 65% for freezer, 102% for clothes washer, 114% for 
dishwasher, and 207% for refrigerator (Perry, 2012).  
Since the first appliance standard enacted in California in 1974, mandatory 
standards, labeling programs, and laws have been adopted for residential appliances and 
equipment at federal levels in the United States. Almost all appliances and equipment 
used in the residential sector are covered by National Minimum Efficiency Standards in 
the U.S. by law. These appliances and equipment range from small light bulbs and 
battery chargers to large refrigerators and pool heaters. Usually states took initiatives first 
and continued to lead on the adoption of different programs and policies. Then federal 
responses were elicited and national Acts got passed by congress. 
4.3.2 Increased Quantity of Electronics and Appliances. 
Even after controlling for income effects, price effects, climate effects, and cross-
state heterogeneity, per capita electricity consumption has been increasing despite the 
increased efficiency of electronics and appliances over time. One plausible explanation 
may be that households choose to purchase more electronics and appliances.  
For common electronics and appliances, like refrigerators and TVs, households 
are more likely to purchase more than one. Take refrigerators as an example. In the 1980 
RECS, 99.7% households in the U.S. reported to own a least one refrigerator. This rate 
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increased only slightly over time and reached 99.82% in the 2009 RECS. However, 
percentage of households having two or more refrigerators has grown steadily, from only 
14% in 1980 to 22.9% in 2009. After purchasing new refrigerators, most households 
continue using the previous old and less energy efficient models. (World Economic 
Forum, 2010). According to the 2009 RECS, approximately 76% of the second-most 
used refrigerators are more than 5 years old and around 49% are more than 10 years old. 
86% households keep the secondary refrigerators running all year round. 
For electronics and appliances that could not be found in most U.S. homes, 
ownership rates have increased significantly. In 1980, only 37.2% U.S. households 
owned a dishwasher. This rate has been increasing over time and reached 59.34% in 
2009.  Furthermore, many modern electronics or electric appliances did not even exist in 
the 1970s and have been gradually introduced into the households over time, like iPhone, 
iPad, espresso machine, etc. 
4.3.3 More Energy-Consuming Attributes. 
Energy efficiency is just one of the many important attributes households desire. 
When purchasing energy efficient electronics and appliances, households are tempted to 
buy newer models with auxiliary energy-consuming attributes, like automatic ice-makers 
and through-the-door dispensers for refrigerators. According to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), just the two aforementioned attributes consume 14% to 20% 
extra energy. Comparing data from the 5 most recent RECSs from 1993 to 2009, the 
proportion of the most-used refrigerators with through-the-door ice and water service has 
risen over time, from approximately 10.5% in 1993 to roughly 33.5% in 2009. Added 
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attributes, like those for newer models of electronics and appliances, may be another 
plausible explanation for the increasing electricity consumption after controlling for 
various exogenous variables. In this paper, we use refrigerators as an example and 
demonstrate how households’ demand for three main energy-related attributes changes 
over time.  
The first attribute investigated in this paper is the refrigerators defrost method. 
Holding other attributes constant, manual defrost refrigerators use less energy than frost 
free. By comparing data from the past 11 RECS (see Table 4.5), the paper finds the 
percentage of the most-used refrigerators that are frost-free has been increasing. In the 
1980 survey, 60.2% most-used refrigerators are frost free, while in 2009 survey, the 
percentage reached 92.4%. 
The second attribute included in the study is the refrigerator door arrangement. In 
table 4.6, the paper summarized door arrangement types for the most-used refrigerator in 
percentages from 1990 to 2009.  The table ordered the types from the most energy-
consuming category “3 or more doors” to the least energy-consuming category “half-
size”.  According to the table, over time, higher percentage of households own the more 
energy consuming types, i.e. “2-doors (side-by-side)” or “3 or more doors”. 
The third attribute examined is the refrigerator size. Generally speaking, the larger 
a refrigerator gets, the greater the energy it consumes. In table 4.7, sizes of the most –
used refrigerators are summarized in percentages of households from 1993 to 2009.  
According to the table, a growing proportion of the most-used refrigerators are large (19-
22 cubic feet) or very large (23 or more cubic feet). 
 69 
Furthermore, when households purchase energy efficient refrigerators, they are 
more inclined to include some extra energy-consuming attributes than when they buy 
standard ones. This can be another plausible explanation for the increased electricity 
consumption. The study compares attributes of energy star refrigerators versus attributes 
of standard refrigerators using data from the 2009 RECS (see Table 4.8). Results indicate 
that existing energy star refrigerators in the residential sector also appear to be bigger in 
size, designed with more complex or energy-consuming door arrangements, and more 
likely to have through-the-door ice and water service. 
4.4 Conclusions & Limitations 
This paper investigates the U.S. residential energy demand during the fairly stable 
time period between 1970s and 2000s. Both state level panel data and multiple household 
level survey data are explored in this research. The study models residential energy 
demands for four main fuels: 1) electricity, 2) natural gas, 3) LPG, 4) other fuels 
aggregated into one category.  
Findings show positive income effects and negative own price effects. Various 
cross price elasticites are also provided suggesting the potential substitution or 
complementary effects between different fuels. Cross-state heterogeneity and the 
existence of endogeneity problems are verified by the statistically significant results. 
Time trend variables suggest different consumption patterns for different fuels over time, 
after controlling for various exogenous variables. For LPG and the aggregated category 
which combines several less commonly used fuels, the per capita consumptions have not 
changed significantly over the years. Per capita natural gas consumption has decreased 
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over time, which can be justified by the long standing technological progress causing 
more efficient use in the residential sector.  One unexpected result is identified.  This 
result indicated increasing per capita electricity consumption over time despite significant 
efficiency improvements over time. To investigate the potential causes for this unusual 
result, multiple household level survey data is incorporated into the research. Two 
potential explanations are suggested by the data. First, households increase fuel 
consumption by purchasing more electronics and electric appliances at home. Second, 
besides energy efficiency, households desire different attributes. Those added attributes 
usually increase energy consumption and offset the expected savings from improved 
energy efficiency. 
There are two main limitations of this study. One comes from the choice of the 
demand model. This paper employs the double-log demand function. This functional 
form imposes the restriction of constant elasticity, which may not be appropriate. 
According to a meta-analysis by Espey & Espey (2004) on residential electricity demand, 
price elasticity estimates did not change significant over time but estimates of income 
elasticity were found to increase over time. The other limitation is caused by the data 
constraints. In this study, fuel prices, real per capita income, HDD and CDD are included 
as control variables. Although those variables are key drivers of the demand, other factors, 
like the house size, the household size, and number or price of appliances, were also 
shown to have a significant influence on the fuel demand (Neeland, 2009;  Inglesi, 2010).  
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5. Conclusions 
The first paper investigates different energy efficiency (EE) investment patterns in 
housing units of homeowners versus renters. In the empirical analysis, discrete choice 
models are employed to explore households’ EE investment behavior. Results 
demonstrate that homeowners on average have a 9.88% higher probability to have EE 
appliances compared with renters, after controlling for climate, housing and personal 
characteristics. In literature, the existing differences were explained as inefficiencies 
caused by landlords’ ownership over some investments and/or utility-included rental 
contracts. However, if we compare homeowners with renters who need to pay the 
monthly utility bills directly, the differences only decrease about 0.15% on average for all 
investments. Statistical results also reveal that the probabilities to have most EE 
appliances are not significantly different between renters paying their monthly energy 
bills and those having their bills paid by landlords due to utility-included rental contracts. 
Furthermore additional analysis suggests that due to costly contracts, renters’ increased 
mobility coupled with the characteristics of typical EE investments account for most of 
the perceived probability differences. In particular, the differences shrink around 74% on 
average if we compare homeowners with long-term tenants living in the current 
residences for more than 10 years.  
The second paper explores households’ choices of energy efficient dishwashers 
and their potential influence on dish washing behaviors.  Household production theory is 
employed to make initial predictions for households’ responses to increased energy 
efficiency. In the empirical analysis, an ordered Probit model is developed to investigate 
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households’ demand for dish washing services and how the choices of energy efficient 
dishwashers influence the quantity demanded for this service. Two-stage residual 
inclusion (2SRI) addresses the endogeneity problem, caused by households potentially 
choosing energy efficient dishwashers because of their expected higher usage frequency. 
With data from the 2009 U.S. residential energy consumption survey, the empirical 
results verify the predicted behavior alteration. Households with energy efficient dish 
washers averaged 1%-3% higher probability of using dishwashers more frequently, 
which is approximately 7.7% more frequent usage or nearly 0.24 additional dishwashing 
times per week compared with those using standard dishwashers. With an estimated 10% 
energy savings from using an energy star dishwasher, this behavior change will offset a 
large proportion of the predicted engineering savings. 
The last paper focuses on the stable U.S. residential energy consumption per 
capita since the 1970s. The paper decomposes energy consumption into four main fuel 
sources and models the demand for each source. Double-log demand models are applied 
and two-stage residual inclusion is employed to address the price endogeneity. Estimation 
is based on panel data, which covers 48 states and spans from 1970 to 2008. Results 
illustrate positive income effects and negative price effects after controlling for the 
climate factors and cross-state heterogeneity. Additionally, this study discovers steady 
per capita consumption of LPG and other fuels over time. Natural gas consumption 
decreases with time, which can be justified by long standing technological progress and 
demonstrates more efficient use. In contrast, after controlling for exogenous variables per 
capita electricity consumption has been increasing with time. This paper investigates 
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multiple household level survey data between 1970 and 2000 to pinpoint the unexpected 
result of electricity consumption. Two potential explanations are provided. First, although 
electricity-consuming products get more efficient over time, households increase the fuel 
consumption by purchasing more electronics and electric appliances. Second, households 
desire product attributes besides energy efficiency. Those attributes usually add extra 
energy consumption and offset the expected savings from increased energy efficiency. 
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Table 2.1 
Weighed frequencies for dependent variables interested 
Investment # of OBS 
Percentage 
with EE 
appliance 
Weighted 
Percentage 
Standard Err of 
Weighted 
Percentage 
Energy Efficient bulbs 7336 88.55% 88.41% 0.42% 
Energy Star Window/Wall AC 1811 63.28% 62.02% 1.40% 
Energy Star refrigerator 11924 40.71% 39.66% 0.48% 
Energy Star clothes washer 6614 67.09% 66.64% 0.77% 
Energy Star dishwasher 4656 64.95% 64.39% 0.81% 
 
Note:  * For each investment, only households having the appliance and providing valid 
answers are included     *Sum of Weights: 113616229     *Number of Replicates: 244     
*Method: Fay’s Balance Repeated Replication   
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Table 2.2 
Percentages of households with EE investments: homeowners versus renters 
Energy Efficiency Investments obs 
Percentage 
with EE 
Investment  
Energy Efficient bulbs installed by household 
(Sample Size=7336,  with 74.14% homeowners and 25.86% renters ) 
owner 5439 91.01% 
renter 1897 80.92% 
Energy Star Wall/Window AC 
(Sample Size=1811,  with 56.71% homeowners and 43.29 % renters ) 
owner 1027 69.72% 
renter 784 54.85% 
Energy Star most-used refrigerator 
(Sample Size=11924,  with 68.17% homeowners and 31.83% renters ) 
owner 8129 48.17% 
renter 3795 24.72% 
Energy Star clothes washer 
(Sample Size=6614,  with 78.32% homeowners and 21.68 % renters ) 
owner 5180 72.14% 
renter 1434 48.81% 
Energy Star dishwasher 
(Sample Size=4656,  with 79.15% homeowners and 20.85% renters ) 
owner 3685 72.81% 
renter 971 35.12% 
 
Note:  Sample changes from investment to investment. For each investment, we only 
included observations that had at least one corresponding appliance at home and 
provided valid answers. 
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Table 2.3 
Independent Variables 
Categories Variables Labels 
Ownership Status OWNER 0 Renters 
1 Owners  
Payment Arrangements Pay 0 Households who don’t pay the related 
energy bills 
1 Households who pay the related energy 
bills 
Energy Price Price Price of the related fuel used 
Climate Related 
Variables 
HDD65 Heating Degree days in 2009, base 
temperature 65F 
CDD65 Cooling Degree days in 2009, base 
temperature 65F 
HDD30YR Heating Degree days, 30-year average 
1981-2010, base temperature 65F 
CDD30YR Cooling Degree days in 2009, 30-year 
average 1981-2010, base temperature 65F 
Climate_Region_Pub Building American Climate Region  (5 
categories): 1. verycold/cold; 2.Hot-
dry/mixed-dry; 3. Hot-humid; 4. mixed-
humid; 5 Marine. 
REGIONC Census region (4 categories) 
 
Housing Characteristics 
TYPEHUQ 1 Mobile Home 
2 Single-Family Detached 
3 Single-Family Attached 
4 Apartment in Building with 2 – 4 Units 
5 Apartment in Building with 5+ Units 
METROMICRO Housing unit in Census Metropolitan 
Statistical Area 
Housing unit in Census Micropolitan 
Statistical Area 
Housing unit in neither 
UR Urban 
Rural 
YEARMADE Year housing unit was built 
TOTROOMS Total number of rooms in the housing unit 
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TOTSQFT Total square footage (includes all attached 
garages, all basements, and 
finished/heated/cooled attics) 
OCCUPYRANGE 1 Before 1950 
2 1950 to 1959 
3 1960 to 1969 
4 1970 to 1979 
5 1980 to 1989 
6 1990 to 1999 
7 2000 to 2004 
8 2005 to 2009 
Householder 
characteristics 
 
 
HHSEX 1 Female 
2 Male 
EMPLOYHH 0 Not employed/retired 
1 Employed full-time 
2 Employed part-time 
SPOUSE 1 Householder lives with spouse or partner 
SDESCENT 1 Householder is Hispanic or Latino 
Householder_Race 1 White Alone 
2=Black or African/American Alone 
3=American Indian or Alaska Native 
Alone, or Asian Alone, or Native Hawaiian 
or Other Pacific Islander Alone, or Some 
Other Race Alone, or 2 or More Races 
Selected 
EDU 0= No schooling completed,  Kindergarten 
to grade 12, or High school diploma or 
GED 
1= Some college no degree, Associate’s 
degree, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, 
Professional degree, or Doctorate degree 
NHSLDMEM Number of household members 
HHAGE Age of householder 
MONEYPY 2009 gross household income 
ATHOME 
1 Household member at home on typical 
week days 
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Table 2.4 
Results from Test 1: homeowners versus renters after controlling for household characteristics 
Investments 
EE light bulbs 
by Households 
Energy Star 
Window/Wall AC 
Energy Star 
Refrigerator 
Energy Star 
clothes washer 
Energy Star dish 
washer 
Sample Size 7336 1811 11924 6614 4656 
P (Homeowners)- P (Renters) 
3.75%*** 
(SE=0.02%) 
Not significantly 
Different 
17.69%*** 
(SE=0.03%) 
11.57%*** 
(SE=0.03%) 
16.40%*** 
(SE=0.06%) 
 
Note:  Significant levels: *denotes 0.1; **=0.05; ***=0.01. 
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Table 2.5 
Results from Test 2.1: homeowners versus renters who need to pay the monthly utility bills 
Investments 
EE light bulbs 
by Households 
Energy Star 
Window/Wall AC 
Energy Star 
Refrigerator 
Energy Star 
clothes washer 
Energy Star dish 
washer 
Sample Size 7029 - 11292 6469 4549 
P(Homeowners)-P(Renters) 
3.21%*** 
(SE=0.02%) 
- 
17.51%*** 
(SE=0.03%) 
11.70%*** 
(SE=0.03%) 
16.39%*** 
(SE=0.06%) 
Comparison: Test 1 3.75%*** 
Not significantly 
different 
17.69% 11.57% 16.40% 
 
Note:  Significant levels: *denotes 0.1; **=0.05; ***=0.01. For Energy Star Window/Wall AC, the number of valid 
respondents becomes too small for the estimation. 
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Table 2.6 
Results from Test 2.2: renters who need to pay the monthly utility bills versus renters whose energy costs are included in rents 
Investments 
EE light bulbs by 
Households 
Energy Star 
Window/Wall AC 
Energy Star 
Refrigerator 
Energy Star 
clothes washer 
Energy Star dish 
washer 
Sample Size 1864 - 3725 1410 954 
P(Renters Pay)- P(Landlord Pay) 
Not significantly 
Different 
- 
-3.63%* 
(SE=0.02%) 
Not significantly 
Different 
Not significantly 
Different 
 
Note:  Significant levels: *denotes 0.1; **=0.05; ***=0.01. For Energy Star Window/Wall AC, the number of valid 
respondents becomes too small for the estimation.  
 94 
Table 2.7 
Results from Test 3.1: homeowners versus long-term renters after controlling for household characteristics 
Investments 
EE light bulbs by 
Households 
Energy Star 
Window/Wall AC 
Energy Star 
Refrigerator 
Energy Star clothes 
washer 
Energy Star dish 
washer 
Sample Size 5660 1165 8552 5292 3732 
P(Homeowners)-P (Renters) 
Not significantly 
Different 
Not significantly 
Different 
5.76%* 
(SE=0.01%) 
7.13%* 
(SE=0.02%) 
Not significantly 
Different 
Comparison: Test 1 3.75%*** 
Not significantly 
Different 
17.69%*** 11.57%*** 16.40%*** 
 
Note:  Significant levels: *denotes 0.1; **=0.05; ***=0.01. 
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Table 2.8 
Results from Test 3.2: long-term homeowners versus long-term renters after controlling for household characteristics 
Investments 
EE light bulbs by 
Households 
Energy Star 
Window/Wall AC 
Energy Star 
Refrigerator 
Energy Star clothes 
washer 
Energy Star dish 
washer 
Sample Size 2984 707 4535 2431 1582 
P (Homeowners)-P (Renters) 
Not significantly 
Different 
Not significantly 
Different 
7.04%** 
(SE=0.01%) 
10.13%** 
(SE=0.06%) 
Not significantly 
Different 
Comparison: Test 1 3.75%*** 
Not significantly 
Different 
17.69%*** 11.57%*** 16.40%*** 
 
Note:  Significant levels: *denotes 0.1; **=0.05; ***=0.01. 
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Table 2.9 
Results from Test 3.3: short-term homeowners versus short-term renters after controlling for household characteristics 
Investments 
EE light bulbs by 
Households 
Energy Star 
Window/Wall AC 
Energy Star 
Refrigerator 
Energy Star 
clothes washer 
Energy Star dish 
washer 
Sample Size 4352 1104 7389 4183 3074 
P(Homeowners)-P(Renters) 
4.83%*** 
(SE=0.03%) 
Not significantly 
Different 
17.16%*** 
(SE=0.04%) 
11.23%*** 
(SE=0.03%) 
17.55%*** 
(SE=0.07%) 
Comparison: Test 1 3.75%*** 
Not significantly 
Different 
17.69%*** 11.57%*** 16.40%*** 
 
Note:  Significant levels: *denotes 0.1; **=0.05; ***=0.01. 
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Table 3.1 
Frequency Table for ESDISHW & DISHUSE 
Variable Value Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency Cumulative Percent 
ESDISHW 
0: not energy star dishwasher 1642 35.06 1642 35.06 
1: energy star dishwasher 3042 64.94 4684 100 
DISHUSE 
 
11: less than once a week 639 13.64 639 13.64 
12: once each week 632 13.49 1271 27.13 
13: two to three times a week 1546 33.01 2817 60.14 
20: four to six times a week 884 18.87 3701 79.01 
30: at least once every day 983 20.99 4684 100 
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Table 3.2 
 Two-way Frequency Table of ESDISHW*DISHUSE 
ESDISHW 
DISHUSE 
Total 
< once a week once a week 
2-3 times a 
week 
4-6 times a 
week > once a day 
0： not energy 
star dishwasher 
 Frequency 300 237 546 272 287 1642 
Percent 6.4 5.06 11.66 5.81 6.13 35.06 
Row Pct 18.27 14.43 33.25 16.57 17.48  
Col Pct 46.95 37.5 35.32 30.77 29.2  
1： energy star 
dishwasher 
 Frequency 339 395 1000 612 696 3042 
Percent 7.24 8.43 21.35 13.07 14.86 64.94 
Row Pct 11.14 12.98 32.87 20.12 22.88  
Col Pct 53.05 62.5 64.68 69.23 70.8  
Total  
Frequency 639 632 1546 884 983 4684 
Percent 13.64 13.49 33.01 18.87 20.99 100 
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Table 3.3 
 Selection of Instrumental Variables 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Measures 
Base Case Instrumental Variables Used 
No 
Instrumen
t 
ESFRIG 
(Energy 
Star 
Refrigerat
or) 
KOWNR
ENT 
( 
Homeown
er,  
Renter, or 
Occupant) 
OCCUPYRA
NGE 
(Year-Range 
when 
household 
moved in) 
YEARMA
DE 
(Year 
House 
Built) 
ESFRIG 
+ 
KOWNRE
NT 
ESFRIG + 
 KOWNRENT + 
OCCUPYYRAN
GE 
ESFRIG + 
 
KOWNREN
T + 
OCCUPYY
RANGE 
+YEARMA
DE 
Likelihood Ratio 
(R) 
 
4080000 
 
12200000 
 
5810000 
 
4580000 
 
4080000 
 
12900000 
 
13300000 
 
13300000 
Upper Bound of R 
(U) 
 
55000000 
 
55000000 
 
55000000 
 
55000000 
 
55000000 
 
55000000 
 
55000000 
 
55000000 
Aldrich-Nelson 0.0881 0.2243 0.1208 0.0978 0.0881 0.2339 0.2391 0.2392 
Cragg-Uhler 1 0.0921 0.2512 0.1284 0.1027 0.0921 0.2631 0.2696 0.2697 
Cragg-Uhler 2 0.1265 0.3449 0.1764 0.141 0.1265 0.3613 0.3703 0.3705 
Estrella 0.0955 0.279 0.1352 0.107 0.0955 0.2938 0.302 0.3021 
Adjusted Estrella 0.0955 0.279 0.1352 0.107 0.0955 0.2938 0.302 0.3021 
McFadden's LRI 
0.0742 0.2221 0.1055 0.0832 0.0742 0.2344 0.2413 0.2414 
0.1557 0.3966 0.2136 0.1728 0.1558 0.4134 0.4227 0.4228 
McKelvey-
Zavoina 
 
0.1481 
 
0.3709 
 
0.1969 
 
0.1649 
 
0.1481 
 
0.3854 
 
0.3959 0.3961 
AIC 50953450 42813656 49228101 50457507 50951766 42135877 41757208 41752249 
Schwarz Criterion 
50953932 42814154 49228615 50458098 50952264 
 
 
42136406 
 
 
41757846 41752903 
N = # of observations, K = # of regressors 
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Table 3.4  
Parameter Estimates for the First Stage 
Parameter Label Estimate Standard Error t Value 
Approx 
Pr > |t| 
Intercept  0.747942 0.003531 211.80 <.0001 
ESFRIG 1: The most used refrigerator is energy-star 1.207367 0.000461 2618.9 <.0001 
 0: The most used refrigerator is not energy star (Base case) 
KOWNRENT 1: Rented -0.403806 0.000656 -615.72 <.0001 
 2: Occupied without payment of rent 0.145965 0.002976 -49.04 <.0001 
 3: Owned by someone in the household (Base case) 
OCCUPYYRANGE 1: Before 1950 0.548525 0.00613 89.48 <.0001 
 2: 1950 to 1959 0.149939 0.002487 60.3 <.0001 
 3: 1960 to 1069 0.585318 0.001746 335.29 <.0001 
 4: 1970 to 1979 0.247685 0.001116 222.03 <.0001 
 5: 1980 to 1989 0.206039 0.000919 224.28 <.0001 
 6: 1990 to 1999 0.390768 0.000703 555.59 <.0001 
 7: 2000 to 2004 0.197163 0.000636 310.13 <.0001 
 8: 2005 to 2009 (Base Case) 
price Energy price 5.624074 0.019215 292.69 <.0001 
HHINCOME Gross household income 2009 0.004467 0.000007701 580.07 <.0001 
PAY 0: Don’t pay the energy bill 0.033917 0.001503 22.56 <.0001 
 1: Pay the energy bill (Base Case) 
HHAGE Householder age 0.00366 0.000019612 186.62 <.0001 
NHSLDMEM Number of Household Members 0.034341 0.000202 170.28 <.0001 
NUMMEAL 0:Never cooks (if volunteered) -0.439239 0.003383 -129.83 <.0001 
 1:Three or more times a day -0.142523 0.001572 -90.67 <.0001 
 2:Two times a day 0.007287 0.001365 5.34 <.0001 
 3:Once a day  -0.052619 0.001326 -39.68 <.0001 
 4:A few times a week -0.101821 0.00135 -75.44 <.0001 
 101 
 5:About once a week -0.323698 0.001754 -184.57 <.0001 
 6:Less than once a week (Base Case) 
ATHOME 
0: No household stays home on typical week 
days -0.073434 0.000524 -140.06 <.0001 
 1: Yes. There are households staying home on typical weekdays (Base Case) 
EDUCATION 0: No schooling completed -0.776434 0.003907 -198.71 <.0001 
 1: Kindergarten to grade 12 -0.337016 0.002377 -141.78 <.0001 
 2: High school diploma or GED -0.397397 0.00208 -191.06 <.0001 
 3: Some college, no degree -0.261867 0.002073 -126.33 <.0001 
 4: Associate's degree -0.332572 0.002125 -156.47 <.0001 
 5: Bachelor's degree -0.265154 0.002054 -129.09 <.0001 
 6: Master's degree -0.251832 0.002117 -118.98 <.0001 
 7: Professional degree -0.083004 0.002559 -32.44 <.0001 
 8: Doctorate degree (Base Case) 
EMPLOYHH 0:  Not employed/retired -0.083922 0.000843 -99.52 <.0001 
 1: Employed full-time -0.05982 0.000797 -75.04 <.0001 
 2: Employed part-time (Base Case) 
SPOUSE 
0: No. Householder isn’t living with a spouse 
or partner 0.01261 0.000599 21.07 <.0001 
 1: Yes. Householder is living with a spouse or partner (Base Case) 
Householder_Race 1: White Alone -0.052799 0.001974 -26.75 <.0001 
 2: Black or African/American Alone -0.08042 0.002093 -38.42 <.0001 
 3: American Indian or Alaska Native Alone -0.29119 0.003231 -90.12 <.0001 
 4: Asian Alone -0.449237 0.002349 -191.24 <.0001 
 
5: Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
Alone -0.179078 0.004688 -38.2 <.0001 
 6: Some Other Race Alone -0.364557 0.002812 -129.63 <.0001 
 7: 2 or More Races Selected (Base Case) 
HHSEX 1: Householder is Female -0.080055 0.000462 -173.25 <.0001 
 2: Householder is Male (Base Case) 
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Table 3.5 
 Parameter Estimates for the Second Stage 
Parameter Label Estimate Standard Error t Value Approx 
Pr > |t| 
Intercept   0.592261 0.00251 236.01 <.0001 
Residual   -0.007986 0.000499 -16.00 <.0001 
ESDISHW 1: Energy Star dishwasher 0.126528 0.000758 166.78 <.0001 
 0: Not energy Star dishwasher (Base Case) 
price Energy price -0.039416 0.000119 -330.58 <.0001 
HHINCOME Gross household income 2009 0.002102 0.0000058 362.3 <.0001 
PAY 0: Don’t pay the energy bill 0.412326 0.001082 380.99 <.0001 
 1: Pay the energy bill (Base Case) 
HHAGE Householder age 0.000232 0.0000132 17.66 <.0001 
NHSLDMEM Number of Household Members 0.205863 0.000151 1360.98 <.0001 
NUMMEAL 0:Ne ver cooks (if volunteered) 0.245995 0.002745 89.63 <.0001 
 1:Three or more times a day 0.67012 0.001174 570.72 <.0001 
 2:Two times a day 0.679177 0.001008 673.71 <.0001 
 3:Once a day  0.497852 0.000978 509.2 <.0001 
 4:A few times a week 0.31831 0.000996 319.5 <.0001 
 5:About once a week 0.172902 0.001315 131.53 <.0001 
 6:Less than once a week (Base Case) 
ATHOME 0: No household stays home during a 
typical weekday. -0.179317 0.000386 -464.85 <.0001 
 1: Yes. There are households staying home during typical weekdays (Base Case) 
EDUCATION 0: No schooling completed -0.42439 0.002868 -147.98 <.0001 
 1: Kindergarten to grade 12 -0.25999 0.001647 -157.82 <.0001 
 2: High school diploma or GED -0.127021 0.001385 -91.71 <.0001 
 3: Some college, no degree -0.031513 0.001376 -22.9 <.0001 
 4: Associate's degree 0.008835 0.001423 6.21 <.0001 
 5: Bachelor's degree 0.023551 0.001361 17.3 <.0001 
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 6: Master's degree -0.02712 0.001407 -19.28 <.0001 
 7: Professional degree 0.169634 0.001714 98.96 <.0001 
 8: Doctorate degree (Base Case) 
EMPLOYHH 0:  Not employed/retired -0.108693 0.000622 -174.86 <.0001 
 1: Employed full-time -0.099214 0.000586 -169.35 <.0001 
 2: Employed part-time (Base Case)  
SPOUSE 0: No. Householder isn’t living with spouse 
or partner -0.289674 0.000442 -655.27 <.0001 
 1: Yes. Householder is living with spouse or partner (Base Case) 
Householder_Rac
e 
1: White Alone 
-0.03854 0.00144 -26.76 <.0001 
 2: Black or African/American Alone -0.390314 0.001528 -255.42 <.0001 
 3: American Indian or Alaska Native Alone -0.002558 0.002417 -1.06 0.2899 
 4: Asian Alone -0.70014 0.001724 -406.18 <.0001 
 5: Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 
Islander Alone -0.916469 0.003444 -266.14 <.0001 
 6: Some Other Race Alone -0.010842 0.002062 -5.26 <.0001 
 7: 2 or More Races Selected (Base Case) 
HHSEX 1: Householder is Female 0.02477 0.000341 72.66 <.0001 
 2: Householder is Male (Base Case) 
_Limit2 Cutoff value 1 0.560413 0.000213 2626.06 <.0001 
_Limit3 Cutoff value 2 1.544346 0.000292 5291.99 <.0001 
_Limit4 Cutoff value 3 2.159709 0.000329 6555.16 <.0001 
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Table 3.6 
Average MEs for Key Variables in the First Stage Regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Sample Size=4684; All estimates are significant at a significant level of 1% (***). 
  
Key Variables Marginal Effects 
Variable Label Mean Std Error 
ESFRIG 1: Energy Star Refrigerator 0.334192*** 0.0017266 
  0: Standard Refrigerator (Base Case)  
KOWNRENT 1: Renters -0.11177*** 0.000577466 
  2: Occupants without payments -0.04040*** 0.000208738 
  3: Homeowners (Base Case)  
OCCUPYYRANGE 1: Moved in before 1950 0.151828*** 0.000784422 
  2: 1950 to 1959 0.041502*** 0.000214422 
  3: 1960 to 1069 0.162012*** 0.000837039 
  4: 1970 to 1979 0.068558*** 0.000354204 
  5: 1980 to 1989 0.05703*** 0.000294647 
  6: 1990 to 1999 0.108162*** 0.000558821 
  7: 2000 to 2004 0.054573*** 0.000281954 
  8: 2005 to 2009 (Base Case)  
PRICE Energy Price (In cent/1000BTU) 0.0155671*** 0.000080428 
HHINCOME 2009 Gross Household Income (In 1000$) 0.001236*** 0.000006388 
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Table 3.7 
Average MEs for Key Variables in the Second Stage Regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Sample Size=4684; Standard errors are in the parentheses; All estimates are significant at a significant level of 1% (***). 
 
  
Control Variables  Average Marginal Effects on the Probabilities for different Dishwasher Usage Behavior 
Variable 
Label 
< once a week Once each week 2 - 3 times a week 
4 - 6 times a 
week > once each day 
ESDISHW 
Energy Star 
Dishwasher 
- 
0.0237722*** 
-0.0127270*** -0.0067986*** 0.0104966*** 0.0328012*** 
(0.000188653) (0.000077003) (0.000245882) (0.000118708) (0.000186537) 
PRICE 
Energy Price 
 (In 
cent/1000BTU) 
0.0074054*** 0.0039647*** 0.0021179*** -0.0032699*** -0.0102181*** 
(0.000058768) (0.000023996) (0.000076596) (0.000036979) (0.000058109) 
HHINCOME 
2009 Gross 
Household Income 
(in 1000$) 
-0.000394820*** -0.000211377*** -0.000112914*** 0.000174332*** 0.000544778*** 
(0.000003133) (0.000001279) (0.00000408) (0.0000019716) (0.000003098) 
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Table 3.8 
Dishwashing Frequencies with Standard Dishwashers 
Usage Frequency  Weights 
Households without Energy-Star Dishwasher 
Percentage/ 
Probabilities Weights*Probabilities 
Expected Weekly 
Usage Frequency 
Expected 
Yearly Usage 
Frequency 
Less than once a week 0.5 18.27% 0.09135 
3.119 162.188 
Once each week 1 14.43% 0.1443 
2 or 3 times a week 2.5 33.25% 0.83125 
4 to 6 times a week 5 16.57% 0.8285 
At least once each day 7 17.48% 1.2236 
 
Note: Assume 52 weeks a year. 
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Table 3.9 
 Dishwashing Frequencies with Energy Star Dishwashers 
Usage Frequency  Weights 
Households without Energy-Star Dishwasher 
Percentage/ 
Probabilities Weights*Probabilities 
Expected Weekly Usage 
Frequency 
Expected Yearly 
Usage Frequency 
Less than once a week 0.5 11.14% 0.0557 
3.61485 187.9722 
Once each week 1 12.98% 0.1298 
2 or 3 times a week 2.5 32.87% 0.82175 
4 to 6 times a week 5 20.12% 1.006 
At least once each day 7 22.88% 1.6016 
 
Note: Assume 52 weeks a year. 
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Table 3.10 
Changes in Dishwashing Frequencies by Choosing Energy Star Dishwashers 
Usage Frequency  Weights 
Changes Due to Increased Efficiency 
Changes in  
Percentage/ 
Probabilities 
Weights*  
Changes in 
Probabilities 
Expected Change 
 in Weekly Usage 
Frequency 
Expected Change 
 in annual Usage 
Frequency 
Less than once a week 0.5 -2.38% -0.011883 
0.24041 
 
12.50141 
 
Once each week 1 -1.27% -0.012723 
2 or 3 times a week 2.5 -0.68% -0.016991 
4 to 6 times a week 5 1.05% 0.05247 
At least once each day 7 3.28% 0.22954 
 
Note: Assume 52 weeks a year. 
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Table 3.11 
Changes in Dishwashing Frequencies for 1 cent/1000BTU increase in Energy Price  
Usage Frequency  Weights 
Price Effect 
Changes in  
Percentage/ 
Probabilities 
Weights*  
Changes in 
Probabilities 
Expected Change 
 in Weekly Usage 
Frequency 
Expected Change 
 in annual Usage 
Frequency 
Less than once a week 0.5 0.74% 0.00370259 
-0.07491075 
 
-3.895359 
 
Once each week 1 0.40% 0.00396446 
2 or 3 times a week 2.5 0.21% 0.00529435 
4 to 6 times a week 5 -0.32% -0.0163488 
At least once each day 7 -1.02% -0.0752335 
 
Note: Assume 52 weeks a year. 
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Table 3.12 
Changes in Dishwashing Frequencies for 1000$ increase in Household Income  
Usage Frequency  Weights 
Income Effect 
Changes in  
Percentage/ 
Probabilities 
Weights*  
Changes in 
Probabilities 
Expected Change 
 in Weekly Usage 
Frequency 
Expected Change 
 in annual Usage 
Frequency 
Less than once a week 0.5 -0.04% -0.0002 
0.003994 
 
0.207701 
 
Once each week 1 -0.02% -0.00021 
2 or 3 times a week 2.5 -0.01% -0.00028 
4 to 6 times a week 5 0.02% 0.000872 
At least once each day 7 0.05% 0.003814 
Note: Assume 52 weeks a year 
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Description 
ESRCB 1872 13.07146 4.266088 4.760386 24.11803 Million Btu 
NGRCB 1872 18.53084 10.00656 0.463558 65.67316 Million Btu 
PARCB 1872 9.338514 10.26056 0.209419 58.86025 Million Btu 
OFRCB 1872 32.55617 9.101561 13.1953 57.71003 Million Btu 
ESRCD 1872 16.89494 4.611282 6.596667 32.21263 Dollars per Million Btu 
NGRCD 1872 4.625226 1.43034 1.693896 10.35804 Dollars per Million Btu 
PARCD 1872 6.969624 2.13952 2.21257 17.80444 Dollars per Million Btu 
OFRCD 1872 0.096995 0.077676 0.003389 0.620284 Dollars per Million Btu 
PerY 1872 13863.74 3161.73 6773.20 26829.59 Dollars 
CDD 1872 1087.52 777.999 80 3875 Base: 65F 
HDD 1872 5238.85 2046.75 400 10745 Base: 65F 
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Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Log (Key Variables) 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
LESRCB 1872 2.514691 0.339909 1.560329 3.18296 
LNGRCB 1872 2.700042 0.803249 -0.76882 4.18469 
LPARCB 1872 1.697295 1.082739 -1.56342 4.075166 
LOFRCB 1872 3.442224 0.289933 2.579861 4.055431 
LESRCD 1872 2.789624 0.275641 1.886565 3.472359 
LNGRCD 1872 1.482182 0.320103 0.527031 2.337763 
LPARCD 1872 1.897392 0.295137 0.794155 2.879448 
LOFRCD 1872 -2.61433 0.778105 -5.68738 -0.47758 
LPerY 1872 9.511804 0.224169 8.820728 10.19726 
LPop 1872 14.99728 0.99532 12.71828 17.41502 
LCDD 1872 6.732036 0.749116 4.382027 8.262301 
LHDD 1872 8.4590868 0.5128356 5.9914645 9.2821958 
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Table 4.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Instrumental Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Description 
CLPRB 1872 0.516026 0.499877 0 1 Dummy Variable 
EMFDB 1872 0.264957 0.441428 0 1 Dummy Variable 
NGMPB 1872 0.636218 0.481216 0 1 Dummy Variable 
NUETB 1872 0.586539 0.492586 0 1 Dummy Variable 
PAPRB 1872 0.623932 0.484527 0 1 Dummy Variable 
REPRB 1872 1.19E+08 1.68E+08 865000 1.16E+09 Billion Btu 
LAGESRCB 1872 63202670 64012937 1715963 4.33E+08 Billion Btu 
LAGNGRCB 1872 1.01E+08 1.27E+08 505239 6.7E+08 Billion Btu 
LAGPARCB 1872 36787519 52934875 345619.1 4.04E+08 Billion Btu 
LAGOFRCB 1872 1.57E+08 1.52E+08 5325331 9.59E+08 Billion Btu 
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Table 4.4 
Demand Elasticities for Four Fuels 
  
 
Electricity Natural Gas LPG Other-Fuels 
Electricity Price -0.31837*** 
(0.04316) 
0.04722 
(0.07164) 
-1.91311*** 
(0.1568) 
-0.14819*** 
(0.04524) 
Natural Gas Price 0.46261*** 
(0.02728) 
-1.08626*** 
(0.04528) 
-0.10837 
(0.09912) 
0.47435*** 
(0.0286) 
LPG Price -0.09917*** 
(0.02491) 
0.38978*** 
(0.04135) 
-0.04828 
(0.0905) 
-0.05584** 
(0.02611) 
Other-Fuels Price -0.03602*** 
(0.00639) 
0.0666*** 
(0.0106) 
0.15183*** 
(0.02321) 
-0.02971*** 
(0.0067) 
Per Capita Income 0.22674*** 
(0.03941) 
0.46192*** 
(0.06541) 
1.47013*** 
(0.14316) 
0.14718*** 
(0.04131) 
Cooling Degree Days 0.00663 
(0.011) 
0.03591** 
(0.01826) 
0.13485*** 
(0.03997) 
0.00279 
(0.01153) 
Heating Degree Days 0.14339*** 
(0.02567) 
0.70141*** 
(0.04261) 
0.65994*** 
(0.09325) 
0.14109*** 
(0.02691) 
 
Note:  Significant levels: *denotes 0.1; **=0.05; ***=0.01. Standard Errors are 
included in the brackets. 
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Table 4.5 
Defrost Method of Most-Used Refrigerators from 1980 to 2009 in Percentages 
Year 
Defrost Method 
Frost-Free Manual 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1984 
1987 
1990 
1993 
1997 
2001 
2005 
2009 
60.56% 39.44% 
62.94% 37.06% 
62.99% 37.01% 
62.59% 37.41% 
67.43% 32.57% 
79.56% 20.44% 
84.77% 15.23% 
86.89% 13.11% 
90.73% 9.27% 
92.78% 7.22% 
92.76% 7.24% 
 
Data Source:  Residential Energy Consumption Survey in 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1987, 
1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2009 conducted by Energy Information 
Administration. 
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Table 4.6 
Door Arrangement of Most-Used Refrigerators from 1990 to 2009 in Percentages 
Type 
Year 
1990 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 
3 or More Doors 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.80% 
2-Doors (side-by-side) 16.73% 17.13% 20.44% 25.37% 29.81% 34.34% 
2-Doors (top and bottom) 67.23% 73.85% 68.14% 68.35% 58.36% 55.40% 
Regular (single door) 14.73% 8.22% 10.72% 5.34% 10.93% 8.30% 
Half-Size/Other 1.30% 0.80% 0.70% 0.94% 0.90% 1.16% 
 
Data Source:  Residential Energy Consumption Survey in 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005 
and 2009 conducted by Energy Information Administration. 
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Table 4.7 
Size of the Most-Used Refrigerator from 1993 to 2009 in Percentages 
 
 
Data Source:  Residential Energy Consumption Survey in 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005 and 
2009 conducted by Energy Information Administration. 
  
 
Year 
Size 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 
Very Small (Less than 11 cf) 1.30% 0.90% 0.56% 0.63% 0.79% 
Small (11-14cf) 9.22% 7.62% 5.34% 4.86% 3.70% 
Medium (15-18cf) 54.41% 45.09% 48.88% 48.42% 45.64% 
Large (19-22 cf) 31.06% 44.89% 40.26% 38.43% 42.29% 
Very Large (23 or More cf) 4.01% 1.50% 4.96% 7.65% 7.58% 
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Table 4.8 
Attributes of Most-Used Refrigerators in 2009 in Percentages: Energy-Star versus Standard 
  
Standard Energy-Star 
Door Arrangements 
Half-size or compact 1.21 0.47 
Full-size with one door 9.16 5.34 
Full-size with two doors, freezer above the refrigerator 61.36 33.52 
Full-size with two doors, freezer below the refrigerator 3.89 12.44 
Full-size with two doors, freezer next to the refrigerator 23.88 45.96 
Full-size with three or more doors 0.23 1.83 
Other kind 0.27 0.43 
    
Size 
Very Small (Less than 11 cf) 1.21 0.47 
Small (11-14cf) 4.39 2.3 
Medium (15-18cf) 55.42 33.3 
Large (19-22 cf) 35.02 51.17 
Very Large (23 or More cf) 3.96 12.74 
    
Ice or Water  
No such Service 77.83 49.69 
Through-the-Door Ice or Water  22.17 50.31 
 
Data Source: 2009 Residential Energy Consumption Survey conducted by Energy 
Information Administration.  
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Figure 4.1 U.S. Residential Energy Consumption per Capita 1949-2012 
(Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, January 2014 Monthly Energy Review and U.S. 
Census, Current Population Survey) 
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Appendix A 
Identified Determinants of Energy-related behavior  
Sources 
Related Project or Data 
Sources 
Behavior 
Identified Determinants of Energy-Related 
Behavior 
Barton, Blackwell, 
Carrington, Ford, 
Lawson & 
Stephenson (2013) 
The Energy Cultures 
research project (2009-
2012). 
Residential energy-
related behavior  
with respect to 
space heating and 
hot water heating 
Value of protecting the environment; achievement 
values such as being competent, intelligent, efficient; 
family and friends; tradespeople and design 
professionals 
Mirosa, Lawson & 
Gnoth (2011) 
Interviews of residents in 
three communities in New 
Zealand  
Residential 
Energy-related 
behavior  
Achievement values such as capability and 
intelligence 
Santin (2011) 
Household Survey carried 
out by the OTB Research 
Institute (2008) 
Residential 
Energy-related 
behavior in relation 
to heating 
Household characteristic, lifestyle, background, 
motivation, values and attitude 
Lawson, Mirosa, 
Gnoth & Hunter 
(2010) 
Interviews of residents in 
three communities in New 
Zealand  
Residential 
Energy-related 
behavior  
Capability, respect for tradition, protecting the 
environment, intelligence, being helpful, and social 
recognition 
Druckman & 
Jackson (2008) 
UK household  energy 
consumption and the 
associated carbon dioxide 
emissions at national level, 
small geographical areas 
and household level for 
2004-5 
Residential 
Energy-related 
behavior  
Income levels, type of dwelling, tenure, household 
composition and rural/urban location 
Uitdenbogerd, 
Egmond, Jonkers & 
Kok (2007) 
Based on a review study of 
all relevant literature in the 
field of energy 
conservation and consumer 
behavior commissioned by 
Dutch Ministry of Housing 
Energy-Related 
behavior 
Personal determinants with internal determinants 
(e.g.  Knowledge, attitudes, values and skills to 
perform the behavior) and demographical 
determinants (e.g. sex, age, education, income, 
number of children and household type); External or 
contextual determinants (e.g. whether people have 
social support and whether they have access to 
financial resources and services, price measures, and 
regulatory measures). 
Allen & Janda 
(2006) 
Pilot Study of Real Time 
Feedback in Oberlin 
Homes (2006) 
Residential 
Energy-related 
behavior 
Income 
Staats, Harland & 
Wilke (2004) 
Based on a -year 
longitudinal study on Eco 
Team Program (ETP) 
participants 
Proenvironmental 
behavior 
Intention and Habit 
Schipper, Bartlett, 
Hawk & Vine 
(1989) 
 
Energy-related 
behavior in general 
Life-styles, price, and income 
Heslop, Moran & 
Cousineau (1981) 
Data obtained by mailed 
questionaire and availabe 
electricity record of 
Canadian consumers for 
1973-1978 in  the midsize 
southwetern Ontario city of 
Guelph. 
Direct residential 
electricity use 
behavior 
Household characteristics, family size and price 
consciousness 
Seligman, Kriss, 
Darley, Fazlo, Beck 
& Pryor (1979) 
Based on two surveys done 
in New Jersey 
Residential 
summer electric 
use behavior 
Homeowners' attitude toward energy use, especially 
attitudes about their comfort 
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Appendix B 
Binary logit model for choice of energy star light bulbs 
Parameter  Estimate Standard 
Error 
t Value Approx 
Pr > |t| 
Intercept  5.035553 3.733258 1.35 0.1774 
OWNER 0 -0.392435 0.119686 -3.28 0.001 
TOTSQFT  -0.00007714 0.000043045 -1.79 0.0731 
PRICE  -3.879156 2.837935 -1.37 0.1717 
EDU 0 -0.266485 0.086454 -3.08 0.0021 
HHINCOME  -0.001037 0.001433 -0.72 0.4695 
REGIONC 1 0.203875 0.190413 1.07 0.2843 
REGIONC 2 0.184413 0.172814 1.07 0.2859 
REGIONC 4 0.509463 0.198663 2.56 0.0103 
TYPEHUQ 1 0.123578 0.240707 0.51 0.6077 
TYPEHUQ 3 0.15201 0.16329 0.93 0.3519 
TYPEHUQ 4 -0.125925 0.167294 -0.75 0.4516 
TYPEHUQ 5 -0.111339 0.154388 -0.72 0.4708 
HDD65  -0.000144 0.000154 -0.94 0.3492 
CDD65  -0.000185 0.000199 -0.93 0.3526 
HDD30YR  0.000232 0.000162 1.44 0.1508 
CDD30YR  0.00012 0.000216 0.55 0.5806 
Climate_Region_Pub 2 -0.077264 0.260328 -0.3 0.7666 
Climate_Region_Pub 3 0.109003 0.287567 0.38 0.7046 
Climate_Region_Pub 4 0.611319 0.169959 3.6 0.0003 
Climate_Region_Pub 5 0.159392 0.275119 0.58 0.5623 
METROMICRO MICRO -0.049505 0.146736 -0.34 0.7358 
METROMICRO NONE 0.027182 0.203125 0.13 0.8935 
UR R -0.072964 0.114424 -0.64 0.5237 
YEARMADE  -0.002142 0.00187 -1.15 0.252 
OCCUPYYRANGE 1 17.891019 4217.501476 0 0.9966 
OCCUPYYRANGE 2 0.391773 0.404618 0.97 0.3329 
OCCUPYYRANGE 3 0.281371 0.278854 1.01 0.313 
 123 
OCCUPYYRANGE 4 0.486843 0.217696 2.24 0.0253 
OCCUPYYRANGE 5 0.246055 0.16726 1.47 0.1413 
OCCUPYYRANGE 6 0.436538 0.121958 3.58 0.0003 
OCCUPYYRANGE 7 0.288547 0.112375 2.57 0.0102 
WALLTYPE 1 -0.142043 0.112393 -1.26 0.2063 
WALLTYPE 2 0.097868 0.125555 0.78 0.4357 
WALLTYPE 4 0.222502 0.159388 1.4 0.1627 
WALLTYPE 5 -0.181322 0.312402 -0.58 0.5616 
WALLTYPE 6 0.158674 0.421727 0.38 0.7067 
WALLTYPE 7 0.66256 0.208864 3.17 0.0015 
WALLTYPE 8 19.90387 0.000354 56177.4 <.0001 
WALLTYPE 9 0.500252 0.751176 0.67 0.5054 
ROOFTYPE 1 0.27935 0.233037 1.2 0.2306 
ROOFTYPE 2 -0.358761 0.152386 -2.35 0.0186 
ROOFTYPE 3 0.35043 0.218076 1.61 0.1081 
ROOFTYPE 4 -0.192644 0.318116 -0.61 0.5448 
ROOFTYPE 6 0.239762 0.121008 1.98 0.0475 
ROOFTYPE 7 -0.365482 0.296257 -1.23 0.2173 
ROOFTYPE 8 0.321019 0.47745 0.67 0.5014 
TOTROOMS  0.113479 0.030764 3.69 0.0002 
HHSEX 2 -0.138829 0.078837 -1.76 0.0782 
EMPLOYHH 0 -0.007108 0.108229 -0.07 0.9476 
EMPLOYHH 2 0.045588 0.13092 0.35 0.7277 
SPOUSE 0 -0.121119 0.093055 -1.3 0.1931 
SDESCENT 1 -0.175109 0.114684 -1.53 0.1268 
RACE 2 -0.264863 0.121108 -2.19 0.0287 
RACE 3 -0.135867 0.134492 -1.01 0.3124 
NHSLDMEM  -0.073446 0.031909 -2.3 0.0214 
HHAGE  0.036605 0.013929 2.63 0.0086 
SAGE  -0.000388 0.000137 -2.84 0.0046 
ATHOME 0 -0.170272 0.088535 -1.92 0.0545 
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Appendix C 
Binary logit model for choice of energy star window/wall AC 
Parameter  Estimate Standard 
Error 
t 
Value 
Approx 
Pr > |t| 
Intercept  0.787674 4.922684 0.16 0.8729 
OWNER 0 -0.107676 0.15371 -0.7 0.4836 
TOTSQFT  0.000093457 0.000072994 1.28 0.2004 
PRICE  1.269056 3.370153 0.38 0.7065 
EDU 0 -0.114383 0.117446 -0.97 0.3301 
HHINCOME  0.004327 0.002116 2.04 0.0409 
REGIONC 2 -0.863105 0.177471 -4.86 <.0001 
REGIONC 3 -0.461602 0.234757 -1.97 0.0493 
REGIONC 4 -1.152285 0.288509 -3.99 <.0001 
TYPEHUQ 1 -0.018281 0.267397 -0.07 0.9455 
TYPEHUQ 3 0.288359 0.224287 1.29 0.1986 
TYPEHUQ 4 -0.10442 0.204532 -0.51 0.6097 
TYPEHUQ 5 -0.05988 0.219832 -0.27 0.7853 
HDD65  0.00014 0.000213 0.66 0.5096 
CDD65  -0.000422 0.000376 -1.12 0.2618 
HDD30YR  -0.000136 0.000221 -0.62 0.5374 
CDD30YR  0.000412 0.000389 1.06 0.2893 
Climate_Region_Pub 2 1.005637 0.414484 2.43 0.0153 
Climate_Region_Pub 3 -0.029347 0.428009 -0.07 0.9453 
Climate_Region_Pub 4 -0.181004 0.189318 -0.96 0.339 
Climate_Region_Pub 5 0.161903 0.398607 0.41 0.6846 
METROMICRO MICRO 0.071763 0.199238 0.36 0.7187 
METROMICRO NONE 0.135885 0.238539 0.57 0.5689 
UR R 0.401879 0.172509 2.33 0.0198 
YEARMADE  -0.00129 0.002459 -0.52 0.5998 
OCCUPYYRANGE 1 -0.009318 0.828237 -0.01 0.991 
OCCUPYYRANGE 2 0.505891 0.459401 1.1 0.2708 
OCCUPYYRANGE 3 0.225193 0.395403 0.57 0.569 
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OCCUPYYRANGE 4 0.314087 0.271907 1.16 0.248 
OCCUPYYRANGE 5 0.227042 0.225628 1.01 0.3143 
OCCUPYYRANGE 6 -0.007497 0.164417 -0.05 0.9636 
OCCUPYYRANGE 7 -0.024301 0.155418 -0.16 0.8758 
WALLTYPE 1 -0.088934 0.164815 -0.54 0.5895 
WALLTYPE 2 -0.004621 0.155387 -0.03 0.9763 
WALLTYPE 4 0.395412 0.259576 1.52 0.1277 
WALLTYPE 5 0.054277 0.361911 0.15 0.8808 
WALLTYPE 6 -0.390189 0.49765 -0.78 0.433 
WALLTYPE 7 -0.176002 0.349875 -0.5 0.6149 
WALLTYPE 9 -1.37264 0.8202 -1.67 0.0942 
ROOFTYPE 1 -0.309953 0.778491 -0.4 0.6905 
ROOFTYPE 2 -0.084652 0.225117 -0.38 0.7069 
ROOFTYPE 3 -0.208913 0.233898 -0.89 0.3718 
ROOFTYPE 4 -0.342083 0.423762 -0.81 0.4195 
ROOFTYPE 6 0.035207 0.152466 0.23 0.8174 
ROOFTYPE 7 1.265528 1.082079 1.17 0.2422 
ROOFTYPE 8 0.079878 0.430648 0.19 0.8529 
TOTROOMS  0.035725 0.043381 0.82 0.4102 
HHSEX 2 0.189646 0.109252 1.74 0.0826 
EMPLOYHH 0 0.127992 0.143112 0.89 0.3711 
EMPLOYHH 2 0.010015 0.175063 0.06 0.9544 
SPOUSE 0 -0.180235 0.121383 -1.48 0.1376 
SDESCENT 1 -0.129565 0.155201 -0.83 0.4038 
RACE 2 0.312293 0.163237 1.91 0.0557 
RACE 3 -0.192352 0.184215 -1.04 0.2964 
NHSLDMEM  -0.009508 0.042241 -0.23 0.8219 
HHAGE  0.082029 0.019629 4.18 <.0001 
SAGE  -0.000758 0.000197 -3.85 0.0001 
ATHOME 0 0.050599 0.123153 0.41 0.6812 
 
 
 126 
Appendix D 
Binary logit model for choice of energy star refrigerator 
Parameter  Estimate Standard 
Error 
t 
Value 
Approx 
Pr > |t| 
Intercept  -9.24354 1.905231 -4.85 <.0001 
OWNER 0 -0.820566 0.066552 -12.33 <.0001 
TOTSQFT  0.000032966 0.000021068 1.56 0.1176 
price  0.494653 1.835137 0.27 0.7875 
EDU 0 0.041192 0.045797 0.9 0.3684 
HHINCOME  0.003459 0.000727 4.76 <.0001 
REGIONC 1 0.48708 0.094 5.18 <.0001 
REGIONC 2 0.113608 0.082624 1.37 0.1691 
REGIONC 4 0.074737 0.101556 0.74 0.4618 
TYPEHUQ 1 -0.545826 0.11751 -4.64 <.0001 
TYPEHUQ 3 -0.051861 0.082247 -0.63 0.5283 
TYPEHUQ 4 -0.150392 0.097137 -1.55 0.1216 
TYPEHUQ 5 -0.184646 0.08776 -2.1 0.0354 
HDD65  0.000227 0.000077463 2.93 0.0034 
CDD65  0.000253 0.000116 2.19 0.0283 
HDD30YR  -0.00033 0.000081416 -4.05 <.0001 
CDD30YR  -0.00036 0.000124 -2.9 0.0037 
Climate_Region_Pub 2 0.305575 0.135223 2.26 0.0238 
Climate_Region_Pub 3 0.014217 0.144854 0.1 0.9218 
Climate_Region_Pub 4 -0.094789 0.079044 -1.2 0.2304 
Climate_Region_Pub 5 0.021151 0.138343 0.15 0.8785 
METROMICRO MICRO -0.001053 0.072673 -0.01 0.9884 
METROMICRO NONE -0.050523 0.096082 -0.53 0.599 
UR R 0.160853 0.057036 2.82 0.0048 
YEARMADE  0.003885 0.00095 4.09 <.0001 
OCCUPYYRANGE 1 -0.000268 0.321357 0 0.9993 
OCCUPYYRANGE 2 -0.171709 0.186388 -0.92 0.3569 
OCCUPYYRANGE 3 -0.122976 0.134041 -0.92 0.3589 
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OCCUPYYRANGE 4 -0.133975 0.096959 -1.38 0.167 
OCCUPYYRANGE 5 -0.215106 0.082154 -2.62 0.0088 
OCCUPYYRANGE 6 -0.362128 0.061145 -5.92 <.0001 
OCCUPYYRANGE 7 -0.103381 0.058394 -1.77 0.0767 
WALLTYPE 1 0.145756 0.058629 2.49 0.0129 
WALLTYPE 2 -0.044057 0.060164 -0.73 0.464 
WALLTYPE 4 0.002489 0.083695 0.03 0.9763 
WALLTYPE 5 -0.027318 0.159754 -0.17 0.8642 
WALLTYPE 6 0.44998 0.207975 2.16 0.0305 
WALLTYPE 7 0.100319 0.110816 0.91 0.3653 
WALLTYPE 8 1.110831 0.796427 1.39 0.1631 
WALLTYPE 9 -0.908413 0.360251 -2.52 0.0117 
ROOFTYPE 1 -0.189352 0.117758 -1.61 0.1078 
ROOFTYPE 2 -0.149575 0.087795 -1.7 0.0884 
ROOFTYPE 3 0.048267 0.101128 0.48 0.6332 
ROOFTYPE 4 -0.046112 0.184789 -0.25 0.8029 
ROOFTYPE 6 -0.024315 0.056122 -0.43 0.6648 
ROOFTYPE 7 -0.132067 0.17819 -0.74 0.4586 
ROOFTYPE 8 0.189451 0.199646 0.95 0.3427 
TOTROOMS  0.060659 0.014837 4.09 <.0001 
HHSEX 2 0.002473 0.041107 0.06 0.952 
EMPLOYHH 0 -0.015516 0.055761 -0.28 0.7808 
EMPLOYHH 2 -0.088066 0.068447 -1.29 0.1982 
SPOUSE 0 -0.168114 0.04922 -3.42 0.0006 
SDESCENT 1 0.045739 0.06589 0.69 0.4876 
RACE 2 0.256775 0.065373 3.93 <.0001 
RACE 3 -0.158537 0.076132 -2.08 0.0373 
NHSLDMEM  0.037651 0.017016 2.21 0.0269 
HHAGE  0.061128 0.007958 7.68 <.0001 
SAGE  -0.00063 0.000077279 -8.16 <.0001 
ATHOME 0 -0.037762 0.046396 -0.81 0.4157 
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Appendix E 
Binary logit model for choice of energy star clothes washer 
Parameter  Estimate Standard 
Error 
t 
Value 
Approx 
Pr > |t| 
Intercept  -0.803709 2.69013 -0.3 0.7651 
OWNER 0 -0.579678 0.08411 -6.89 <.0001 
TOTSQFT  0.000080505 0.000031178 2.58 0.0098 
price  3.909566 2.786659 1.4 0.1606 
EDU 0 -0.051007 0.063642 -0.8 0.4229 
HHINCOME  0.002826 0.001023 2.76 0.0057 
REGIONC 1 0.311969 0.136549 2.28 0.0223 
REGIONC 2 0.074704 0.111652 0.67 0.5034 
REGIONC 4 -0.169904 0.136427 -1.25 0.213 
TYPEHUQ 1 -0.298892 0.150428 -1.99 0.0469 
TYPEHUQ 3 0.128867 0.113188 1.14 0.2549 
TYPEHUQ 4 0.189578 0.137771 1.38 0.1688 
TYPEHUQ 5 -0.002673 0.126651 -0.02 0.9832 
HDD65  0.000104 0.000113 0.92 0.3575 
CDD65  0.000168 0.00015 1.12 0.2622 
HDD30YR  -0.000199 0.000118 -1.69 0.0914 
CDD30YR  -0.000276 0.000161 -1.72 0.0853 
Climate_Region_Pub 2 -0.200785 0.186418 -1.08 0.2814 
Climate_Region_Pub 3 -0.44081 0.200377 -2.2 0.0278 
Climate_Region_Pub 4 -0.371814 0.116832 -3.18 0.0015 
Climate_Region_Pub 5 -0.044664 0.19036 -0.23 0.8145 
METROMICRO MICRO -0.007389 0.099671 -0.07 0.9409 
METROMICRO NONE -0.163305 0.128752 -1.27 0.2047 
UR R 0.208323 0.077717 2.68 0.0074 
YEARMADE  -0.000034641 0.001342 -0.03 0.9794 
OCCUPYYRANGE 1 -0.570394 0.476917 -1.2 0.2317 
OCCUPYYRANGE 2 0.453118 0.296942 1.53 0.127 
OCCUPYYRANGE 3 0.142849 0.200281 0.71 0.4757 
 129 
OCCUPYYRANGE 4 0.043564 0.139123 0.31 0.7542 
OCCUPYYRANGE 5 0.030286 0.116044 0.26 0.7941 
OCCUPYYRANGE 6 0.344114 0.08774 3.92 <.0001 
OCCUPYYRANGE 7 0.095446 0.079497 1.2 0.2299 
WALLTYPE 1 0.061204 0.082454 0.74 0.4579 
WALLTYPE 2 -0.14033 0.083458 -1.68 0.0927 
WALLTYPE 4 0.084128 0.115795 0.73 0.4675 
WALLTYPE 5 0.032754 0.215176 0.15 0.879 
WALLTYPE 6 0.199905 0.32672 0.61 0.5406 
WALLTYPE 7 0.220473 0.155597 1.42 0.1565 
WALLTYPE 8 19.344852 8613.059215 0 0.9982 
WALLTYPE 9 -0.748417 0.440643 -1.7 0.0894 
ROOFTYPE 1 -0.030771 0.15509 -0.2 0.8427 
ROOFTYPE 2 -0.17954 0.116985 -1.53 0.1249 
ROOFTYPE 3 -0.048249 0.136464 -0.35 0.7237 
ROOFTYPE 4 -0.223863 0.255492 -0.88 0.3809 
ROOFTYPE 6 0.14074 0.079822 1.76 0.0779 
ROOFTYPE 7 0.407439 0.263628 1.55 0.1222 
ROOFTYPE 8 0.073001 0.282264 0.26 0.7959 
TOTROOMS  0.04885 0.021481 2.27 0.023 
HHSEX 2 -0.038868 0.057928 -0.67 0.5022 
EMPLOYHH 0 -0.107358 0.077044 -1.39 0.1635 
EMPLOYHH 2 0.142128 0.09825 1.45 0.148 
SPOUSE 0 -0.231515 0.067711 -3.42 0.0006 
SDESCENT 1 -0.07959 0.089126 -0.89 0.3719 
RACE 2 0.067005 0.093498 0.72 0.4736 
RACE 3 -0.250857 0.105161 -2.39 0.0171 
NHSLDMEM  0.021916 0.023042 0.95 0.3415 
HHAGE  0.068342 0.011037 6.19 <.0001 
SAGE  -0.000644 0.000109 -5.9 <.0001 
ATHOME 0 -0.034805 0.064949 -0.54 0.592 
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Appendix F 
Binary logit model for choice of energy star dishes washer 
Parameter  Estimate Standard 
Error 
t 
Value 
Approx 
Pr > |t| 
Intercept  -3.625463 3.383987 -1.07 0.284 
OWNER 0 -0.860815 0.111162 -7.74 <.0001 
TOTSQFT  0.000049606 0.000034807 1.43 0.1541 
price  4.900801 3.37064 1.45 0.146 
EDU 0 -0.111565 0.081397 -1.37 0.1705 
HHINCOME  0.005031 0.001191 4.23 <.0001 
REGIONC 1 0.63525 0.164994 3.85 0.0001 
REGIONC 2 0.250334 0.139121 1.8 0.072 
REGIONC 4 0.195296 0.17723 1.1 0.2705 
TYPEHUQ 1 -0.368476 0.223231 -1.65 0.0988 
TYPEHUQ 3 0.237541 0.135629 1.75 0.0799 
TYPEHUQ 4 -0.01487 0.188426 -0.08 0.9371 
TYPEHUQ 5 -0.214065 0.146935 -1.46 0.1452 
HDD65  0.00042 0.000133 3.17 0.0015 
CDD65  0.000587 0.000201 2.92 0.0035 
HDD30YR  -0.00042 0.000138 -3.05 0.0023 
CDD30YR  -0.000537 0.000216 -2.49 0.0129 
Climate_Region_Pub 2 0.306121 0.231888 1.32 0.1868 
Climate_Region_Pub 3 0.104222 0.245999 0.42 0.6718 
Climate_Region_Pub 4 0.019957 0.138559 0.14 0.8855 
Climate_Region_Pub 5 0.298241 0.229331 1.3 0.1934 
METROMICRO MICRO -0.003832 0.134319 -0.03 0.9772 
METROMICRO NONE -0.130029 0.180375 -0.72 0.471 
UR R 0.368645 0.096646 3.81 0.0001 
YEARMADE  0.000631 0.00169 0.37 0.709 
OCCUPYYRANGE 1 1.151005 1.13299 1.02 0.3097 
OCCUPYYRANGE 2 0.419924 0.393032 1.07 0.2853 
OCCUPYYRANGE 3 0.807315 0.283877 2.84 0.0045 
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OCCUPYYRANGE 4 0.110138 0.179042 0.62 0.5385 
OCCUPYYRANGE 5 0.181199 0.143766 1.26 0.2075 
OCCUPYYRANGE 6 0.324769 0.109394 2.97 0.003 
OCCUPYYRANGE 7 0.21886 0.095991 2.28 0.0226 
WALLTYPE 1 0.237698 0.097971 2.43 0.0153 
WALLTYPE 2 0.209797 0.103642 2.02 0.0429 
WALLTYPE 4 -0.082825 0.141559 -0.59 0.5585 
WALLTYPE 5 0.222689 0.289605 0.77 0.4419 
WALLTYPE 6 0.457454 0.371105 1.23 0.2177 
WALLTYPE 7 0.155312 0.183868 0.84 0.3983 
WALLTYPE 9 -0.982627 0.544496 -1.8 0.0711 
ROOFTYPE 1 0.276352 0.205414 1.35 0.1785 
ROOFTYPE 2 -0.245019 0.161782 -1.51 0.1299 
ROOFTYPE 3 0.200252 0.202375 0.99 0.3224 
ROOFTYPE 4 0.315057 0.35097 0.9 0.3694 
ROOFTYPE 6 0.146652 0.097962 1.5 0.1344 
ROOFTYPE 7 0.411468 0.309416 1.33 0.1836 
ROOFTYPE 8 0.128319 0.395159 0.32 0.7454 
TOTROOMS  0.076233 0.025539 2.98 0.0028 
HHSEX 2 0.094485 0.070582 1.34 0.1807 
EMPLOYHH 0 0.007611 0.097238 0.08 0.9376 
EMPLOYHH 2 0.134005 0.120275 1.11 0.2652 
SPOUSE 0 -0.037907 0.088432 -0.43 0.6682 
SDESCENT 1 -0.119215 0.12751 -0.93 0.3498 
RACE 2 0.12402 0.125196 0.99 0.3219 
RACE 3 -0.420849 0.13306 -3.16 0.0016 
NHSLDMEM  0.009288 0.030807 0.3 0.7631 
HHAGE  0.057526 0.013837 4.16 <.0001 
SAGE  -0.000538 0.000138 -3.91 <.0001 
ATHOME 0 -0.064971 0.078544 -0.83 0.4081 
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Appendix G 
First Stage Results for Electricity Price 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
 
Estimate Error 
  Intercept -14.8759 10.98063 -1.35 0.1757 
CLPRB 0.45539 0.32083 1.42 0.156 
EMFDB 0.33689 0.15934 2.11 0.0346 
NGMPB 2.05461 0.33527 6.13 <.0001 
NUETB 0.35469 0.18049 1.97 0.0495 
PAPRB 2.61595 1.37579 1.9 0.0574 
REPRB 4.47E-09 1.33E-09 3.36 0.0008 
LAGESRCB -7.19E-08 1.21E-08 -5.94 <.0001 
LAGNGRCB -3.15E-09 2.84E-09 -1.11 0.2677 
LAGPARCB -5.10E-09 2.49E-09 -2.05 0.0407 
LAGOFRCB 3.41E-08 5.57E-09 6.11 <.0001 
LNGRCD 1.90068 0.28541 6.66 <.0001 
LPARCD 1.27172 0.24532 5.18 <.0001 
LOFRCD 0.70154 0.09554 7.34 <.0001 
LPerY 0.93135 0.95982 0.97 0.332 
LCDD 0.4062 0.26862 1.51 0.1307 
LHDD 1.4047 0.62193 2.26 0.024 
T -0.19819 0.01702 -11.65 <.0001 
Nstate_1 -0.43325 0.96917 -0.45 0.6549 
Nstate_2 3.13531 0.85764 3.66 0.0003 
Nstate_3 4.81542 1.03945 4.63 <.0001 
Nstate_4 2.8626 2.11047 1.36 0.1751 
Nstate_5 2.56606 0.52023 4.93 <.0001 
Nstate_6 13.12646 1.5825 8.29 <.0001 
Nstate_7 12.05249 1.57017 7.68 <.0001 
Nstate_8 3.46804 1.71503 2.02 0.0433 
Nstate_9 5.7756 1.73917 3.32 0.0009 
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Nstate_10 8.27249 1.5516 5.33 <.0001 
Nstate_11 1.33758 1.53232 0.87 0.3828 
Nstate_12 5.68848 1.54123 3.69 0.0002 
Nstate_13 1.09158 0.75495 1.45 0.1484 
Nstate_14 3.60839 0.68518 5.27 <.0001 
Nstate_15 -1.02402 0.71298 -1.44 0.1511 
Nstate_16 2.93245 1.14406 2.56 0.0105 
Nstate_17 13.30879 1.63424 8.14 <.0001 
Nstate_18 5.9612 1.53477 3.88 0.0001 
Nstate_19 11.44349 1.5348 7.46 <.0001 
Nstate_20 3.94887 1.24728 3.17 0.0016 
Nstate_21 6.3666 1.58858 4.01 <.0001 
Nstate_22 2.85482 0.78442 3.64 0.0003 
Nstate_23 2.03875 1.01343 2.01 0.0444 
Nstate_24 -0.86048 0.48471 -1.78 0.076 
Nstate_25 6.36748 1.68275 3.78 0.0002 
Nstate_26 0.76336 0.47706 1.6 0.1097 
Nstate_27 0.86345 0.68273 1.26 0.2061 
Nstate_28 13.91645 1.51931 9.16 <.0001 
Nstate_29 15.16948 1.69747 8.94 <.0001 
Nstate_30 5.52899 0.62898 8.79 <.0001 
Nstate_31 2.65606 0.83966 3.16 0.0016 
Nstate_32 10.32994 1.61445 6.4 <.0001 
Nstate_33 3.21399 1.30371 2.47 0.0138 
Nstate_34 2.50419 0.8035 3.12 0.0019 
Nstate_35 -1.33169 1.59656 -0.83 0.4043 
Nstate_36 4.72366 1.16994 4.04 <.0001 
Nstate_37 14.23475 1.53231 9.29 <.0001 
Nstate_38 6.72466 1.7115 3.93 <.0001 
Nstate_39 2.80913 0.61485 4.57 <.0001 
Nstate_40 -3.10883 0.78738 -3.95 <.0001 
 134 
Nstate_41 3.23894 1.38681 2.34 0.0196 
Nstate_42 2.33475 0.55697 4.19 <.0001 
Nstate_43 1.18113 0.73272 1.61 0.1071 
Nstate_44 10.57512 1.52322 6.94 <.0001 
Nstate_45 -4.67006 1.9208 -2.43 0.0151 
Nstate_46 6.33691 1.60663 3.94 <.0001 
Nstate_47 0.47741 0.6238 0.77 0.4442 
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Appendix H 
First Stage Results for Natural Gas Price 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
 
Estimate Error 
  Intercept 9.50252 3.94721 2.41 0.0162 
CLPRB -0.11684 0.1154 -1.01 0.3114 
EMFDB 0.16201 0.057 2.84 0.0045 
NGMPB -0.28208 0.12194 -2.31 0.0208 
NUETB 0.24106 0.06435 3.75 0.0002 
PAPRB -0.13564 0.4953 -0.27 0.7842 
REPRB 1.74E-10 4.80E-10 0.36 0.717 
LAGESRCB -2.46E-09 4.36E-09 -0.56 0.5737 
LAGNGRCB -6.15E-09 1.00E-09 -6.13 <.0001 
LAGPARCB 1.32E-10 8.99E-10 0.15 0.8831 
LAGOFRCB 2.24E-09 2.01E-09 1.11 0.2652 
LESRCD 0.69272 0.14093 4.92 <.0001 
LPARCD 2.3434 0.07407 31.64 <.0001 
LOFRCD 0.01459 0.03515 0.42 0.6782 
LPerY -0.94799 0.34492 -2.75 0.006 
LCDD 0.05836 0.09673 0.6 0.5464 
LHDD -0.44478 0.22407 -1.99 0.0473 
T 0.04817 0.00624 7.72 <.0001 
Nstate_1 0.26004 0.34805 0.75 0.4551 
Nstate_2 -0.69429 0.30965 -2.24 0.0251 
Nstate_3 -0.1748 0.37597 -0.46 0.642 
Nstate_4 1.4668 0.75569 1.94 0.0524 
Nstate_5 0.46382 0.1877 2.47 0.0136 
Nstate_6 2.62574 0.5768 4.55 <.0001 
Nstate_7 0.99705 0.57283 1.74 0.0819 
Nstate_8 -0.02087 0.61713 -0.03 0.973 
Nstate_9 -0.13521 0.62738 -0.22 0.8294 
 136 
Nstate_10 0.19399 0.56252 0.34 0.7302 
Nstate_11 0.36426 0.55103 0.66 0.5087 
Nstate_12 2.57137 0.54892 4.68 <.0001 
Nstate_13 1.03342 0.26898 3.84 0.0001 
Nstate_14 0.17546 0.24803 0.71 0.4794 
Nstate_15 -0.02448 0.25651 -0.1 0.924 
Nstate_16 -0.7513 0.41231 -1.82 0.0686 
Nstate_17 2.46025 0.59568 4.13 <.0001 
Nstate_18 1.58885 0.55238 2.88 0.0041 
Nstate_19 1.87161 0.56013 3.34 0.0009 
Nstate_20 1.70643 0.44577 3.83 0.0001 
Nstate_21 0.39499 0.57381 0.69 0.4913 
Nstate_22 0.74134 0.28154 2.63 0.0085 
Nstate_23 -0.9143 0.365 -2.5 0.0123 
Nstate_24 0.15958 0.17431 0.92 0.3601 
Nstate_25 0.30619 0.60788 0.5 0.6145 
Nstate_26 0.49583 0.17135 2.89 0.0039 
Nstate_27 0.11111 0.24558 0.45 0.651 
Nstate_28 1.59756 0.55732 2.87 0.0042 
Nstate_29 1.77044 0.61967 2.86 0.0043 
Nstate_30 -0.50389 0.23139 -2.18 0.0296 
Nstate_31 0.16858 0.30238 0.56 0.5773 
Nstate_32 3.30523 0.57863 5.71 <.0001 
Nstate_33 2.1181 0.46402 4.56 <.0001 
Nstate_34 -0.04401 0.28944 -0.15 0.8792 
Nstate_35 1.41115 0.57302 2.46 0.0139 
Nstate_36 2.37819 0.41683 5.71 <.0001 
Nstate_37 1.96223 0.56159 3.49 0.0005 
Nstate_38 0.06747 0.61843 0.11 0.9131 
Nstate_39 0.3462 0.22255 1.56 0.12 
Nstate_40 -0.35979 0.28489 -1.26 0.2068 
 137 
Nstate_41 -0.05376 0.49805 -0.11 0.9141 
Nstate_42 -0.12315 0.20114 -0.61 0.5405 
Nstate_43 1.42685 0.26057 5.48 <.0001 
Nstate_44 1.01205 0.55534 1.82 0.0686 
Nstate_45 0.53865 0.69258 0.78 0.4368 
Nstate_46 0.84176 0.58006 1.45 0.1469 
Nstate_47 0.66448 0.22291 2.98 0.0029 
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Appendix I 
First Stage Results for LPG Price 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
 
Estimate Error 
  Intercept -9.74508 7.52679 -1.29 0.1956 
CLPRB 0.54698 0.22001 2.49 0.013 
EMFDB -0.73804 0.10774 -6.85 <.0001 
NGMPB -0.50403 0.23277 -2.17 0.0305 
NUETB -0.7357 0.12346 -5.96 <.0001 
PAPRB 0.80264 0.9439 0.85 0.3952 
REPRB 7.36E-10 9.14E-10 0.8 0.421 
LAGESRCB 7.00E-08 8.29E-09 8.44 <.0001 
LAGNGRCB 7.38E-09 1.94E-09 3.81 0.0001 
LAGPARCB 5.66E-10 1.71E-09 0.33 0.7413 
LAGOFRCB -2.64E-08 3.83E-09 -6.91 <.0001 
LESRCD 0.8012 0.2703 2.96 0.0031 
LNGRCD 4.48236 0.16528 27.12 <.0001 
LOFRCD 0.96958 0.06423 15.1 <.0001 
LPerY 0.45567 0.65829 0.69 0.4889 
LCDD -0.08324 0.1845 -0.45 0.6519 
LHDD 0.72927 0.42688 1.71 0.0877 
t 0.02195 0.01218 1.8 0.0717 
Nstate_1 0.67877 0.66448 1.02 0.3072 
Nstate_2 1.46222 0.58931 2.48 0.0132 
Nstate_3 2.16412 0.71572 3.02 0.0025 
Nstate_4 -1.86485 1.44667 -1.29 0.1975 
Nstate_5 -0.75436 0.3585 -2.1 0.0355 
Nstate_6 -3.25326 1.10242 -2.95 0.0032 
Nstate_7 -1.44701 1.0937 -1.32 0.186 
Nstate_8 2.38001 1.17689 2.02 0.0433 
Nstate_9 0.77037 1.196 0.64 0.5196 
 139 
Nstate_10 -0.97475 1.07286 -0.91 0.3637 
Nstate_11 0.06889 1.05098 0.07 0.9477 
Nstate_12 -3.99387 1.05409 -3.79 0.0002 
Nstate_13 -1.76741 0.51688 -3.42 0.0006 
Nstate_14 0.36763 0.47316 0.78 0.4373 
Nstate_15 -0.10077 0.4896 -0.21 0.8369 
Nstate_16 2.68698 0.78349 3.43 0.0006 
Nstate_17 -3.76948 1.13819 -3.31 0.0009 
Nstate_18 -1.54466 1.05664 -1.46 0.144 
Nstate_19 -3.53258 1.06808 -3.31 0.001 
Nstate_20 -2.36102 0.85452 -2.76 0.0058 
Nstate_21 -0.55682 1.0945 -0.51 0.611 
Nstate_22 -1.50809 0.53868 -2.8 0.0052 
Nstate_23 2.37064 0.69347 3.42 0.0006 
Nstate_24 -0.25843 0.33264 -0.78 0.4373 
Nstate_25 -1.00442 1.15972 -0.87 0.3866 
Nstate_26 -0.98801 0.32675 -3.02 0.0025 
Nstate_27 0.95314 0.46821 2.04 0.0419 
Nstate_28 -3.13455 1.06294 -2.95 0.0032 
Nstate_29 -2.63517 1.18439 -2.22 0.0262 
Nstate_30 0.67769 0.44077 1.54 0.1243 
Nstate_31 0.93852 0.57742 1.63 0.1043 
Nstate_32 -5.37389 1.10869 -4.85 <.0001 
Nstate_33 -3.53781 0.89107 -3.97 <.0001 
Nstate_34 -0.07201 0.55254 -0.13 0.8963 
Nstate_35 -1.44354 1.09541 -1.32 0.1877 
Nstate_36 -4.61975 0.79877 -5.78 <.0001 
Nstate_37 -3.2881 1.07264 -3.07 0.0022 
Nstate_38 0.33163 1.1793 0.28 0.7786 
Nstate_39 -0.38641 0.42466 -0.91 0.363 
Nstate_40 1.13567 0.5423 2.09 0.0364 
 140 
Nstate_41 -1.05403 0.95214 -1.11 0.2684 
Nstate_42 -0.72007 0.38353 -1.88 0.0606 
Nstate_43 -2.17048 0.50071 -4.33 <.0001 
Nstate_44 -2.0304 1.05918 -1.92 0.0554 
Nstate_45 -0.98143 1.32135 -0.74 0.4577 
Nstate_46 -1.42549 1.1069 -1.29 0.198 
Nstate_47 -1.35127 0.42722 -3.16 0.0016 
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Appendix J 
First Stage Results for Other-Fuels Price 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
 
Estimate Error 
  Intercept 1.37769 0.31529 4.37 <.0001 
CLPRB -0.0104 0.00918 -1.13 0.2577 
EMFDB 0.00275 0.00457 0.6 0.5467 
NGMPB 0.00932 0.00975 0.96 0.3396 
NUETB 0.00428 0.0052 0.82 0.4107 
PAPRB -0.06422 0.03954 -1.62 0.1045 
REPRB -8.96E-11 3.82E-11 -2.34 0.0192 
LAGESRCB -4.30E-09 3.26E-10 -13.2 <.0001 
LAGNGRCB 7.39E-11 8.16E-11 0.91 0.3651 
LAGPARCB 8.43E-11 7.18E-11 1.17 0.2405 
LAGOFRCB 1.92E-09 1.52E-10 12.63 <.0001 
LESRCD 0.0336 0.01111 3.02 0.0025 
LNGRCD -0.00344 0.00828 -0.42 0.6778 
LPARCD 0.08959 0.00678 13.22 <.0001 
LPerY -0.14679 0.02741 -5.35 <.0001 
LCDD 0.00549 0.00773 0.71 0.4775 
LHDD -0.01089 0.0179 -0.61 0.5431 
t 0.00073651 0.00050972 1.44 0.1487 
Nstate_1 -0.13165 0.02776 -4.74 <.0001 
Nstate_2 -0.13096 0.02456 -5.33 <.0001 
Nstate_3 -0.15765 0.02982 -5.29 <.0001 
Nstate_4 -0.1626 0.06064 -2.68 0.0074 
Nstate_5 -0.03219 0.01503 -2.14 0.0324 
Nstate_6 -0.05415 0.0462 -1.17 0.2413 
Nstate_7 -0.10032 0.04569 -2.2 0.0282 
Nstate_8 -0.22588 0.04903 -4.61 <.0001 
Nstate_9 -0.18951 0.04997 -3.79 0.0002 
 142 
Nstate_10 -0.11038 0.04485 -2.46 0.014 
Nstate_11 -0.09006 0.04395 -2.05 0.0406 
Nstate_12 -0.11404 0.04432 -2.57 0.0102 
Nstate_13 -0.09531 0.02164 -4.4 <.0001 
Nstate_14 -0.10408 0.01955 -5.32 <.0001 
Nstate_15 -0.0804 0.02049 -3.92 <.0001 
Nstate_16 -0.1748 0.03267 -5.35 <.0001 
Nstate_17 -0.05521 0.04771 -1.16 0.2474 
Nstate_18 -0.11438 0.04419 -2.59 0.0097 
Nstate_19 0.01023 0.04481 0.23 0.8195 
Nstate_20 -0.11487 0.03583 -3.21 0.0014 
Nstate_21 -0.11945 0.04572 -2.61 0.0091 
Nstate_22 -0.11567 0.02251 -5.14 <.0001 
Nstate_23 -0.16254 0.02894 -5.62 <.0001 
Nstate_24 -0.03266 0.01388 -2.35 0.0187 
Nstate_25 -0.16587 0.04845 -3.42 0.0006 
Nstate_26 -0.02235 0.01366 -1.64 0.102 
Nstate_27 -0.09641 0.01929 -5 <.0001 
Nstate_28 -0.01914 0.04456 -0.43 0.6676 
Nstate_29 -0.14731 0.04947 -2.98 0.0029 
Nstate_30 -0.07035 0.01838 -3.83 0.0001 
Nstate_31 -0.09112 0.02405 -3.79 0.0002 
Nstate_32 -0.09796 0.0467 -2.1 0.0361 
Nstate_33 -0.12024 0.03746 -3.21 0.0014 
Nstate_34 -0.11654 0.02301 -5.06 <.0001 
Nstate_35 -0.06208 0.04589 -1.35 0.1763 
Nstate_36 -0.07735 0.03373 -2.29 0.022 
Nstate_37 -0.04214 0.04494 -0.94 0.3485 
Nstate_38 -0.17096 0.04924 -3.47 0.0005 
Nstate_39 -0.0845 0.01749 -4.83 <.0001 
Nstate_40 -0.12184 0.02269 -5.37 <.0001 
 143 
Nstate_41 -0.19463 0.03976 -4.89 <.0001 
Nstate_42 -0.02085 0.01607 -1.3 0.1947 
Nstate_43 -0.05183 0.02106 -2.46 0.0139 
Nstate_44 -0.0049 0.04435 -0.11 0.912 
Nstate_45 -0.02532 0.05536 -0.46 0.6474 
Nstate_46 -0.09523 0.04626 -2.06 0.0397 
Nstate_47 -0.04166 0.01792 -2.33 0.0202 
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Appendix K 
Second Stage Results for Per Capita Electricity Demand 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
 
Estimate Error 
  Intercept -0.72419 0.44387 -1.63 0.103 
LESRCD -0.31837 0.04316 -7.38 <.0001 
LNGRCD 0.46261 0.02728 16.96 <.0001 
LPARCD -0.09917 0.02491 -3.98 <.0001 
LOFRCD -0.03602 0.00639 -5.64 <.0001 
LPerY 0.22674 0.03941 5.75 <.0001 
LCDD 0.00663 0.011 0.6 0.5467 
LHDD 0.14339 0.02567 5.59 <.0001 
T 0.00391 0.00085948 4.55 <.0001 
Nstate_1 0.38556 0.03674 10.49 <.0001 
Nstate_2 0.39044 0.03576 10.92 <.0001 
Nstate_3 0.23691 0.04573 5.18 <.0001 
Nstate_4 -0.26154 0.03864 -6.77 <.0001 
Nstate_5 -0.2015 0.01969 -10.23 <.0001 
Nstate_6 -0.32959 0.03545 -9.3 <.0001 
Nstate_7 -0.00785 0.03143 -0.25 0.8029 
Nstate_8 0.49373 0.06909 7.15 <.0001 
Nstate_9 0.25611 0.03539 7.24 <.0001 
Nstate_10 0.04975 0.02432 2.05 0.041 
Nstate_11 0.23478 0.02352 9.98 <.0001 
Nstate_12 -0.16059 0.02701 -5.94 <.0001 
Nstate_13 0.11902 0.02277 5.23 <.0001 
Nstate_14 0.09219 0.02844 3.24 0.0012 
Nstate_15 0.2611 0.02717 9.61 <.0001 
Nstate_16 0.46699 0.04785 9.76 <.0001 
Nstate_17 -0.49944 0.03272 -15.27 <.0001 
 145 
Nstate_18 -0.09084 0.02908 -3.12 0.0018 
Nstate_19 -0.28742 0.02983 -9.64 <.0001 
Nstate_20 -0.21112 0.02196 -9.62 <.0001 
Nstate_21 -0.12049 0.02055 -5.86 <.0001 
Nstate_22 0.13565 0.02616 5.19 <.0001 
Nstate_23 0.45684 0.04093 11.16 <.0001 
Nstate_24 0.0698 0.01907 3.66 0.0003 
Nstate_25 0.28423 0.0321 8.86 <.0001 
Nstate_26 0.1726 0.02024 8.53 <.0001 
Nstate_27 0.11737 0.02298 5.11 <.0001 
Nstate_28 -0.25873 0.03111 -8.32 <.0001 
Nstate_29 -0.37457 0.03476 -10.77 <.0001 
Nstate_30 -0.26483 0.0298 -8.89 <.0001 
Nstate_31 0.20365 0.03153 6.46 <.0001 
Nstate_32 -0.57885 0.03517 -16.46 <.0001 
Nstate_33 0.00733 0.02386 0.31 0.7587 
Nstate_34 0.37642 0.03268 11.52 <.0001 
Nstate_35 0.20168 0.02719 7.42 <.0001 
Nstate_36 -0.14004 0.02673 -5.24 <.0001 
Nstate_37 -0.51934 0.03207 -16.19 <.0001 
Nstate_38 0.34927 0.03713 9.41 <.0001 
Nstate_39 0.09365 0.02299 4.07 <.0001 
Nstate_40 0.52032 0.0292 17.82 <.0001 
Nstate_41 0.38605 0.04575 8.44 <.0001 
Nstate_42 -0.23758 0.0223 -10.65 <.0001 
Nstate_43 0.11152 0.02834 3.94 <.0001 
Nstate_44 -0.13658 0.02582 -5.29 <.0001 
Nstate_45 0.25297 0.02918 8.67 <.0001 
Nstate_46 -0.14931 0.02136 -6.99 <.0001 
Nstate_47 0.15899 0.02441 6.51 <.0001 
 146 
RE -0.00219 0.0026 -0.84 0.4011 
RP -0.00883 0.00357 -2.47 0.0136 
RO -0.15199 0.04949 -3.07 0.0022 
RN -0.07355 0.00582 -12.65 <.0001 
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Appendix L 
Second Stage Results for Per Capita Natural Gas Demand 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
 
Estimate Error 
  Intercept -7.05202 0.73675 -9.57 <.0001 
LESRCD 0.04722 0.07164 0.66 0.5099 
LNGRCD -1.08626 0.04528 -23.99 <.0001 
LPARCD 0.38978 0.04135 9.43 <.0001 
LOFRCD 0.0666 0.0106 6.28 <.0001 
LPerY 0.46192 0.06541 7.06 <.0001 
LCDD 0.03591 0.01826 1.97 0.0494 
LHDD 0.70141 0.04261 16.46 <.0001 
t 0.00144 0.00143 1.01 0.3144 
Nstate_1 0.36464 0.06098 5.98 <.0001 
Nstate_2 0.3361 0.05935 5.66 <.0001 
Nstate_3 0.18796 0.0759 2.48 0.0134 
Nstate_4 0.44195 0.06414 6.89 <.0001 
Nstate_5 0.16872 0.03269 5.16 <.0001 
Nstate_6 -0.03317 0.05884 -0.56 0.573 
Nstate_7 0.02267 0.05216 0.43 0.6639 
Nstate_8 -0.67644 0.11468 -5.9 <.0001 
Nstate_9 0.50278 0.05874 8.56 <.0001 
Nstate_10 0.35737 0.04037 8.85 <.0001 
Nstate_11 -0.35956 0.03903 -9.21 <.0001 
Nstate_12 0.68962 0.04484 15.38 <.0001 
Nstate_13 0.458 0.0378 12.12 <.0001 
Nstate_14 0.57804 0.04721 12.25 <.0001 
Nstate_15 0.13516 0.0451 3 0.0028 
Nstate_16 0.67232 0.07942 8.47 <.0001 
Nstate_17 0.30564 0.0543 5.63 <.0001 
Nstate_18 0.25383 0.04827 5.26 <.0001 
 148 
Nstate_19 -2.99914 0.04951 -60.58 <.0001 
Nstate_20 0.5546 0.03644 15.22 <.0001 
Nstate_21 0.09448 0.0341 2.77 0.0057 
Nstate_22 0.48156 0.04342 11.09 <.0001 
Nstate_23 0.14029 0.06794 2.07 0.0391 
Nstate_24 0.06467 0.03166 2.04 0.0412 
Nstate_25 -0.39015 0.05327 -7.32 <.0001 
Nstate_26 -0.39496 0.03359 -11.76 <.0001 
Nstate_27 0.35532 0.03815 9.31 <.0001 
Nstate_28 -1.02533 0.05164 -19.86 <.0001 
Nstate_29 0.51525 0.0577 8.93 <.0001 
Nstate_30 0.22985 0.04946 4.65 <.0001 
Nstate_31 0.19514 0.05234 3.73 0.0002 
Nstate_32 0.33969 0.05837 5.82 <.0001 
Nstate_33 0.6371 0.03961 16.08 <.0001 
Nstate_34 0.52165 0.05423 9.62 <.0001 
Nstate_35 -0.22806 0.04513 -5.05 <.0001 
Nstate_36 0.42284 0.04437 9.53 <.0001 
Nstate_37 0.3504 0.05323 6.58 <.0001 
Nstate_38 -0.10698 0.06162 -1.74 0.0827 
Nstate_39 -0.16596 0.03817 -4.35 <.0001 
Nstate_40 -0.24933 0.04847 -5.14 <.0001 
Nstate_41 0.47433 0.07593 6.25 <.0001 
Nstate_42 0.33805 0.03701 9.13 <.0001 
Nstate_43 -0.09182 0.04704 -1.95 0.0511 
Nstate_44 -1.55075 0.04286 -36.18 <.0001 
Nstate_45 -0.39678 0.04844 -8.19 <.0001 
Nstate_46 0.28766 0.03546 8.11 <.0001 
Nstate_47 0.43069 0.04052 10.63 <.0001 
RE 0.01765 0.00432 4.08 <.0001 
RP -0.00511 0.00593 -0.86 0.3896 
 149 
RO -0.49211 0.08214 -5.99 <.0001 
RN 0.15654 0.00965 16.22 <.0001 
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Appendix M 
Second Stage Results for Per Capita LPG Demand 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
 
Estimate Error 
  Intercept -12.42746 1.61257 -7.71 <.0001 
LESRCD -1.91311 0.1568 -12.2 <.0001 
LNGRCD -0.10837 0.09912 -1.09 0.2744 
LPARCD -0.04828 0.0905 -0.53 0.5937 
LOFRCD 0.15183 0.02321 6.54 <.0001 
LPerY 1.47013 0.14316 10.27 <.0001 
LCDD 0.13485 0.03997 3.37 0.0008 
LHDD 0.65994 0.09325 7.08 <.0001 
t -0.06298 0.00312 -20.17 <.0001 
Nstate_1 0.42236 0.13348 3.16 0.0016 
Nstate_2 0.96885 0.12991 7.46 <.0001 
Nstate_3 -0.10132 0.16613 -0.61 0.542 
Nstate_4 -0.69521 0.14039 -4.95 <.0001 
Nstate_5 -0.30514 0.07154 -4.27 <.0001 
Nstate_6 2.49379 0.12878 19.36 <.0001 
Nstate_7 2.17969 0.11417 19.09 <.0001 
Nstate_8 0.7361 0.25101 2.93 0.0034 
Nstate_9 0.19876 0.12858 1.55 0.1223 
Nstate_10 1.2009 0.08836 13.59 <.0001 
Nstate_11 -0.12218 0.08544 -1.43 0.1529 
Nstate_12 0.20957 0.09814 2.14 0.0329 
Nstate_13 0.75348 0.08273 9.11 <.0001 
Nstate_14 0.39539 0.10332 3.83 0.0001 
Nstate_15 0.32608 0.09871 3.3 0.001 
Nstate_16 -0.14454 0.17382 -0.83 0.4058 
Nstate_17 2.52933 0.11886 21.28 <.0001 
Nstate_18 1.22693 0.10564 11.61 <.0001 
 151 
Nstate_19 3.2537 0.10837 30.03 <.0001 
Nstate_20 1.03528 0.07977 12.98 <.0001 
Nstate_21 0.88162 0.07464 11.81 <.0001 
Nstate_22 0.62873 0.09504 6.62 <.0001 
Nstate_23 0.98813 0.1487 6.65 <.0001 
Nstate_24 0.4275 0.06929 6.17 <.0001 
Nstate_25 1.60843 0.1166 13.79 <.0001 
Nstate_26 1.21239 0.07352 16.49 <.0001 
Nstate_27 0.32206 0.08349 3.86 0.0001 
Nstate_28 2.94705 0.11303 26.07 <.0001 
Nstate_29 2.04567 0.1263 16.2 <.0001 
Nstate_30 0.86849 0.10826 8.02 <.0001 
Nstate_31 -0.13482 0.11455 -1.18 0.2394 
Nstate_32 2.2311 0.12777 17.46 <.0001 
Nstate_33 0.68924 0.0867 7.95 <.0001 
Nstate_34 0.28828 0.11871 2.43 0.0153 
Nstate_35 -0.13979 0.09878 -1.42 0.1572 
Nstate_36 1.85425 0.09712 19.09 <.0001 
Nstate_37 2.82457 0.11651 24.24 <.0001 
Nstate_38 1.14896 0.13488 8.52 <.0001 
Nstate_39 1.39671 0.08354 16.72 <.0001 
Nstate_40 -0.27897 0.10608 -2.63 0.0086 
Nstate_41 0.22175 0.1662 1.33 0.1823 
Nstate_42 -0.80972 0.08101 -10 <.0001 
Nstate_43 1.24177 0.10296 12.06 <.0001 
Nstate_44 2.92376 0.09381 31.17 <.0001 
Nstate_45 -0.51222 0.10603 -4.83 <.0001 
Nstate_46 1.25647 0.07761 16.19 <.0001 
Nstate_47 0.34284 0.08869 3.87 0.0001 
RE 0.09043 0.00946 9.56 <.0001 
RP 0.03736 0.01299 2.88 0.0041 
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RO -0.207 0.17978 -1.15 0.2497 
RN 0.05092 0.02113 2.41 0.016 
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Appendix N 
Second Stage Results for Per Capita Demand of Other-Fuels 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
 
Estimate Error 
  Intercept 0.58862 0.46531 1.27 0.206 
LESRCD -0.14819 0.04524 -3.28 0.0011 
LNGRCD 0.47435 0.0286 16.59 <.0001 
LPARCD -0.05584 0.02611 -2.14 0.0326 
LOFRCD -0.02971 0.0067 -4.44 <.0001 
LPerY 0.14718 0.04131 3.56 0.0004 
LCDD 0.00279 0.01153 0.24 0.8091 
LHDD 0.14109 0.02691 5.24 <.0001 
t 0.0003667 0.00090099 0.41 0.6841 
Nstate_1 0.30625 0.03851 7.95 <.0001 
Nstate_2 0.27827 0.03749 7.42 <.0001 
Nstate_3 0.11405 0.04794 2.38 0.0175 
Nstate_4 -0.35176 0.04051 -8.68 <.0001 
Nstate_5 -0.27136 0.02064 -13.14 <.0001 
Nstate_6 -0.41223 0.03716 -11.09 <.0001 
Nstate_7 -0.11209 0.03294 -3.4 0.0007 
Nstate_8 0.37406 0.07243 5.16 <.0001 
Nstate_9 0.16596 0.0371 4.47 <.0001 
Nstate_10 -0.13762 0.0255 -5.4 <.0001 
Nstate_11 0.22671 0.02465 9.2 <.0001 
Nstate_12 -0.24857 0.02832 -8.78 <.0001 
Nstate_13 0.06388 0.02387 2.68 0.0075 
Nstate_14 0.01218 0.02981 0.41 0.683 
Nstate_15 0.24542 0.02848 8.62 <.0001 
Nstate_16 0.33008 0.05016 6.58 <.0001 
Nstate_17 -0.57088 0.0343 -16.65 <.0001 
Nstate_18 -0.16707 0.03048 -5.48 <.0001 
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Nstate_19 -0.31348 0.03127 -10.03 <.0001 
Nstate_20 -0.26346 0.02302 -11.45 <.0001 
Nstate_21 -0.15481 0.02154 -7.19 <.0001 
Nstate_22 0.08008 0.02742 2.92 0.0035 
Nstate_23 0.37705 0.04291 8.79 <.0001 
Nstate_24 0.05354 0.01999 2.68 0.0075 
Nstate_25 0.20322 0.03365 6.04 <.0001 
Nstate_26 0.06336 0.02121 2.99 0.0029 
Nstate_27 0.05293 0.02409 2.2 0.0281 
Nstate_28 -0.32686 0.03261 -10.02 <.0001 
Nstate_29 -0.4908 0.03644 -13.47 <.0001 
Nstate_30 -0.30305 0.03124 -9.7 <.0001 
Nstate_31 0.1319 0.03305 3.99 <.0001 
Nstate_32 -0.64353 0.03687 -17.46 <.0001 
Nstate_33 -0.07233 0.02502 -2.89 0.0039 
Nstate_34 0.27416 0.03425 8 <.0001 
Nstate_35 0.18723 0.0285 6.57 <.0001 
Nstate_36 -0.20582 0.02802 -7.34 <.0001 
Nstate_37 -0.59928 0.03362 -17.83 <.0001 
Nstate_38 0.25381 0.03892 6.52 <.0001 
Nstate_39 0.01235 0.02411 0.51 0.6084 
Nstate_40 0.48275 0.03061 15.77 <.0001 
Nstate_41 0.24283 0.04796 5.06 <.0001 
Nstate_42 -0.28291 0.02338 -12.1 <.0001 
Nstate_43 0.05165 0.02971 1.74 0.0823 
Nstate_44 -0.17336 0.02707 -6.4 <.0001 
Nstate_45 0.25776 0.03059 8.42 <.0001 
Nstate_46 -0.17886 0.0224 -7.99 <.0001 
Nstate_47 0.12455 0.02559 4.87 <.0001 
RE -0.01129 0.00273 -4.14 <.0001 
RP -0.01421 0.00375 -3.79 0.0002 
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RO 0.11748 0.05188 2.26 0.0237 
RN -0.08325 0.0061 -13.66 <.0001 
 
